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Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of
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Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande*
The predominant view in the antitrust field has been that private enforcement, and especially class action cases, yields little or no positive
results. On the contrary, they are counterproductive. This prevailing belief was well summarized by J. Thomas Rosch, a former commissioner
of the Federal Trade Commission, who considered treble damage class
action cases “almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are
generally at issue. . . . [T]he plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . stand to win almost
regardless of the merits of the case.”1 Professor Daniel Crane has gone so
far as to claim that “often” in private antitrust class actions “administrative costs swallow the entire recovery.”2
In light of these widespread beliefs, former Federal Trade Commission Chairman William E. Kovacic summarized the conventional wis*
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1. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks to the Antitrust Modernization Commission 9–10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/RoschAMC%20Remarks.June8.final.pdf. Similarly, when Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil, Gotshal and
Manges’ Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform, he replied:
“[c]lass actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs’ law firms and not to consumers.”
Q&A with Weil Gotshal’s Steven A. Newborn, LAW360 (May 26, 2009), http://competition.law
360.com/articles/103359.
2. Daniel Crane, Optimizing Private Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 683 (2010) [hereinafter Crane, Optimizing].
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dom about private enforcement succinctly and correctly: “private rights
of actions U.S. style are poison.”3 Abbot B. Lipsky, in his testimony before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, likened private antitrust
lawsuits to the “Salem Witch trials.”4 Additionally, a European academic
analogized private antitrust lawsuits to a tort case where a driver allegedly “set the cruise control at 70 mph in his brand new 32-foot Winnebago
motor home. When the car crashed after he got himself a cup of coffee at
the back of the vehicle, [the driver] sued Winnebago for not having
warned him in the manual about the consequences of leaving the drivers
[sic] seat.”5
Despite these strongly worded opinions, most of the argument
about private enforcement of the antitrust laws has been premised on anecdotal, self-serving, and unsubstantiated or insufficiently substantiated
claims. Indeed, our 2008 study of forty private antitrust cases appears to
constitute the only systematic effort to gather information about how a
significant number of private actions have actually proceeded and the
results they have produced.6
Our 2008 study attracted widespread attention because it so strongly challenged the conventional wisdom. It influenced the decision of the

3. FTC:WATCH No. 708, FTC WATCH 4 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.ftcwatch.com/series/
708/ (quoting William E. Kovacic speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where
he summarized the conventional wisdom in the field, but was not necessarily agreeing with it).
4. Abbott Lipsky wrote: “[I]t is possible that the treble-damage claims unintentionally assume
some of the characteristics of a wealth-transfer program that can be gamed to benefit the undeserving . . . [similar to] other bounty payment mechanisms, including the redistributive and unwise legal
methods that produced or at least inflamed the Salem Witch Trials . . . .” ABBOTT B. LIPSKY JR.,
PRIVATE DAMAGES REMEDIES: TREBLE DAMAGES, FEE SHIFTING, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 4–5
(2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Lipsky.pdf.
5. See Angela Wigger, Revisiting the European Competition Reform: The Toll of Private SelfEnforcement 1 (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Political Sci. Dept., Working Paper No. 2004/07,
2004), available at http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Revisiting%20the%20European%20Compet
ition%20Reform_tcm31-42715.pdf (“[This case is] symbolic for an excessive culture of litigation
that has run out of control -[sic] a culture of litigation in which ‘accidents’ hardly exist anymore.
One might wonder how the above examples are related to the recent overhaul of European competition law. Although there is no immediate reason to assume that the EU moves towards a comparable
claimant’s culture found in the US, the abolishment of the notification procedure that came along
with the new competition law enforcement regime of 1 May 2004 raises some concerns that point
into that direction.”). For additional criticisms of private antitrust enforcement, see Robert H. Lande
& Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42
U.S.F. L. Rev. 879, 883–89 (2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits].
6. The current article builds upon and incorporates our earlier work. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 883–89. For the forty underlying case studies, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P.
Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies (Univ.
of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2011-22, 2008) [hereinafter Forty Case Studies], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523; see also Robert H. Lande & Joshua P.
Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (2011) [hereinafter Comparative Deterrence].

2013]

Private Antitrust Enforcement

1271

European Commission to seek expanded private rights of action in Europe7and was considered by the U.S. Congress when it conducted hearings on the “Open Access to Courts Act of 2009.”8 It also was attacked
by leading lawyers and economists at the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ)9 and by leading academics as well, including the esteemed antitrust scholar Professor Daniel Crane of the University of Michigan Law
School.10
Given this subject’s importance and controversial nature, we undertook a supplemental study of twenty additional private antitrust cases.11
This Article analyzes these twenty cases, compares and contrasts their
analysis with that of our earlier group of forty cases, and draws new insights from the results of all sixty combined. We have done this so that
empiricism, rather than conjecture, can inform decision makers about
how private enforcement actually works in practice.12
The primary purpose of our new study was to determine whether
private enforcement provides significant benefits that help further the
overall goals of the private litigation system: compensating the victims of
illegal behavior and deterring anticompetitive behavior.13 To assess these
benefits14 we sought to avoid subjective assessments whenever possible.
7. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, MAKING ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE
EU: WELFARE IMPACT AND POTENTIAL SCENARIOS FINAL REPORT 56 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf (citing
an unpublished version of our study); see also E-mail from Dr. David McFadden, Legal Advisor,
The Irish Competition Auth., to Joshua P. Davis, Assoc. Dean & Professor of Law, Univ. of S.F.
Sch. of Law (July 10, 2012) (on file with author) (explaining that our empirical work provided part
of the basis for the decision of the Irish Competition Authority to switch positions and provide a
submission to the European Commission welcoming introduction of effective collective private
redress under European competition law).
8. See Open Access to the Courts Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4115 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Professor Joshua P. Davis), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Davis091216.pdf.
9. See Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and Detection
of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227–33 (2011) [hereinafter
WHB].
10. See DANIEL CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 168–
72 (2011) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE]; Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2.
11. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private
Antitrust Enforcement, (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2013-01, 2011) [hereinafter Twenty
Case Studies], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961669.
12. Because almost all of the cases ended in settlements, they were extremely difficult to research. We looked for cases that returned a significant amount of cash to the victims, but we did not
look for cases that were per se as opposed to rule of reason, that involved direct instead of indirect
purchasers, that did or did not involve coupons or cy pres grants, etc. For additional information on
our screening criteria, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 889–91.
13. For the compensation and deterrence goals of private antitrust cases, see id. at 881–83.
14. It is important to note various limitations on the information analyzed in this Article. We
attempted to assess some of the benefits from private enforcement, not to perform an overall costbenefit analysis. No effort was made to collect a comprehensive or representative sample of cases.
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As a result, we focused on cases that returned more than $50 million in
cash to victims.15 We did not include cases that obtained an injunction as
their only or primary form of relief. Also, because of our desire to ascertain whether the cases produced benefits that could be assessed objectively, we excluded coupons, products, rebates, discounts, etc. Even
though each of these forms of relief may be extraordinarily valuable, we
did not count them at all because their benefits can be difficult to measure.16
When combined, these two studies demonstrate that private antitrust litigation has provided a substantial amount of compensation for
victims of anticompetitive behavior: at least $33.8 to $35.8 billion.17 The
combined studies also demonstrate that private antitrust enforcement has
had an extremely strong deterrent effect. In fact, this research demonstrates that private enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive
behavior than even the appropriately acclaimed anti-cartel program of
the DOJ Antitrust Division.18
Another purpose of our study was to ascertain the important characteristics of private antitrust cases, many of which could help to influence
the debate over their efficacy. These characteristics include whether there
were indicia that the cases had underlying merit, the significance of recoveries from foreign violators of U.S. antitrust law, and the size of the
applicable attorney’s fee awards. Our study also helps address other interesting questions, including the relationship between private and public
enforcement (do most of the private cases simply follow and mirror public enforcement?); the proportion of per se and rule of reason cases (is
the conventional wisdom correct that private plaintiffs prevail only in per
To the contrary, we included a disproportionate number of exceptionally large cases, and this means
we were disproportionately likely to select class action cases. Moreover, class action settlements
must receive court approval and are a matter of public record. Often parties insist on confidentiality
in the non-class action context, making research of non-class action cases much more difficult and,
for this reason, less likely to appear in this study. Further, we deliberately selected cases that appear
to have had significant merit that can be measured quantitatively (namely, we selected cases that
resulted in damages, not just an injunction). For all these reasons it would be inappropriate to generalize from these sixty cases about whether private antitrust actions on the whole tend to be meritorious or that the results that follow are typical of private antitrust cases. For additional qualifications,
see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 889–91; Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at
345–48.
15. We did, however, study five cases in the $30–$50 million dollar range to see whether they
might be systematically different from the larger cases. See infra Table I.
16. In the Tobacco litigation, for example, the result was an apparent transformation in the
tobacco market spanning numerous years and worth an estimated $484 million. See Twenty Case
Studies, supra note 11, at 70 n.2. None of that sum was included in the analysis below.
17. See infra Part I. This figure is a very conservative evaluation of these compensatory benefits for the reasons stated.
18. See infra Part II.
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se cases?); and the proportion of recoveries by direct purchasers, indirect
purchasers, and competitors. Many of our new findings cut against conventional wisdom. For example, in the sixty cases, recoveries in rule of
reason cases predominated, undermining the widely held view that private plaintiffs rarely obtain meaningful relief unless they are able to pursue a per se theory of liability.
Finally, this Article replies to the criticisms of our earlier study of
private enforcement. We are grateful for the attention our work has received from high-ranking DOJ officials and Professor Daniel Crane of
the University of Michigan Law School. A focused debate holds the
promise for progress in our understanding. For this reason it is important
for us to discuss their criticisms concerning our claims about, respectively, deterrence effects and compensation effects. We explain why their
criticisms are unfounded, and why our earlier study did indeed demonstrate the truly significant benefits of private antitrust enforcement—a
conclusion that our new empirical work reported in this Article confirms
and strengthens.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the empirical results and our analysis based on the combined studies of private enforcement cases. Part II summarizes and responds to the criticisms of our empirical research into private antitrust enforcement. Part III briefly concludes.
I. RESULTS OF THE COMBINED EMPIRICAL STUDIES
A. Compensation of Victims of Anticompetitive Behavior
Private antitrust enforcement provides virtually the only compensation to victims of antitrust violations.19 To be sure, government actors
have mechanisms by which they can seek relief for victims, but these
mechanisms are limited and too rarely pursued.20 Thus, it is a great virtue
of private enforcement if it is able to wrest ill-gotten gains from violators
of the antitrust laws and return them to those to whom they rightly belong. And that is what private enforcement has done. Our empirical work
reveals that in the sixty cases we studied the total recoveries for the victims of the anticompetitive activity at issue were $33.8 to $35.8 billion.21
19. Since the cases were almost all settlements, “alleged victims” would be a more accurate
description.
20. There also can be restitution actions, see infra Appendix A15, and disgorgement actions by
the federal enforcers, but they are relatively rare. In addition, state Attorneys General can file parens
patria actions on behalf of victims in their state. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 884
n.25.
21. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all recoveries, fines, and other figures discussed in this
Article have been expressed in 2011 dollars.
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The forty cases in our 2008 study revealed a total recovery of $22.4
to $24.4 billion.22 Because the study examined only large cases, it was
possible that this study exhausted the major private cases since 1990,
when this study began.23
Our new study of an additional twenty cases, however, casts the
original study in a new light. The new study reflects $11.4 billion in additional recoveries, as Table 1 shows.24 The original finding of $22.4–
$24.4 billion was, then, only a part of the benefits that have arisen from
private enforcement. We remain unsure how many more important recent
cases remain unanalyzed, but the total may well be substantial.25 And
while we make no claims that either the original study or the new study
reflects a random selection of private antitrust cases, the fact that the
twenty new cases total roughly half as much as the original forty cases
could mean the original group of forty cases might not be as anomalous
as at first seemed possible.

22. See infra Appendix Table A8.
23. If so, the first study provided a rough sense of the total amount of money private plaintiffs
recovered. Also, it may well have captured a highly unusual population of private cases, including
all of the largest recoveries.
24. All of the damages figures analyzed in this Study were generated by ourselves and our
researchers, and their methodology is reported in Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 889–91.
The only exception is for the Vitamins cases, where we used the estimates generated by Professor
John M. Connor, for U.S. private cases only. John M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence 131, tbl.18 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 06-02, 2008) (on
file with authors), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/node/10119.
25. For example, due to a variety of data uncertainties we were not able to include analysis of
any of the consumer class action suits against Microsoft or the private cases against Microsoft by
AOL Time Warner, even though a highly respected journalist reported that together these cases
recovered more than $2 billion for victims of antitrust violations. See Todd Bishop, Microsoft Antitrust Payouts, the Grand Total, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (July 7, 2006, 6:50 AM),
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2006/07/07/microsoft-antitrust-payouts-the-grand-total/.
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Table 1: Actual (in nominal dollars) and Present Value (in 2011 dollars)
of the Recoveries in the Twenty Newly Studied Private Cases26

#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Case Name

3M
Air Cargo
De Beers
Electrical Carbon
Fiber
EPDM
High Pressure
Laminates
Intel
MDL v. Hoffman
Methionine
MSG
Mylan(Lorazepam
& Clorazepate)
Novell v.
Microsoft
Ortho Biotech
OSB
Polyester Staple
Scrap Metal
Tobacco
Tricor
Visa MC
Warfarin
Total

Year27

2006
2011
2011
2006
2007
2004
2009
2008
2002
2003
2003
2004
2008
2009
2008
2006
2005
2009
2008
2004

Actual
Recovery
Amount
(Before
CPI/PPI)
136
278
295
30

2011 $s
(millions)
(CPI)
153
278
295
34

107
46

117
55

1250
33
107
123.4
70

1322
35
135
152
86

536

644

200
120.7
61
34.5
310
316
6813
44.5
10909

211
128
64
39
360
334
7180
53
11675

We emphasize that we made no systematic effort to study the nonmonetary relief that private plaintiffs obtained. We did find some indica26. Present values calculated using CPI Inflation Calculator. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). For the formal names and citations
for the cases listed in our Tables, see Appendix Table A1.
27. The year reflects the most recent settlement, if a case involved multiple settlements.
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tions, however, that sometimes private enforcement can result in significant changes in business practice. In the Tobacco litigation, for example,
the private litigation had a profound impact on how tobacco farmers sell
tobacco.28 Nonetheless, we took none of these effects into account in assigning a monetary value to the private recoveries.
B. Deterrence Effects of Private Enforcement
Our earlier study of forty private cases documented between $22
and $24 billion in cash paid by defendants.29 Although we cannot quantify how much anticompetitive conduct was deterred by this litigation, we
can at least place the size of the likely deterrence effects in a comparative
context.
In a 2011 article, we demonstrated that these forty private cases
probably30 deterred more anticompetitive conduct than the entire operation of the DOJ anti-cartel program during the same period (1990–
2007).31 To arrive at this conclusion, we added the total DOJ sanctions
(corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution payments) from every
cartel case that terminated during this period (not just the fines collected
in the forty cases in our study). We added to this a value or disvalue for
every year a corporate officer was sentenced to prison or house arrest.
Treating a year of a prison sentence against an individual employee of a
corporation as having the same deterrence effect as forcing the corporation to pay $6 million and a year of a house arrest as equivalent to forcing a corporation to pay $3 million,32 we concluded that the DOJ’s prosecutions resulted in a total of $7.737 billion in deterrence effects. This
figure, although quite commendable, was only about a third of the deterrence effects from these forty private cases ($22 billion to $24 billion).33
The assumptions we used to undertake this comparison were conservative. This conservatism was reflected in the fact that we analyzed
the deterrence effects from only forty of the many private cases filed dur28. See Twenty Case Studies, supra note 11, at 70.
29. See infra Appendix Table A8.
30. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 317. We qualified our analysis with the word
“probably” for many reasons. For example, some of the private actions were follow-ups to DOJ
enforcement actions, and DOJ fairly should be given some of the credit for the deterrence resulting
from these private cases. Conversely, DOJ enforcement was helped by the specter of private enforcement. For other complexities and qualifications, which apply to the analysis performed in this
Article as well, see id. at 315.
31. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6.
32. To simplify calculations, we did not adjust the value of prison or house arrest for inflation.
We simply used $6 million as the disvalue of a year and $3 million for the disvalue of a year spent
under house arrest, even if this occurred in 1990.
33. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 337–38. For qualifications to this conclusion,
caveats, and notes, see id. at 345–48.
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ing this period. Our conservatism was shown also by the equivalent deterrence dollar amount ascribed to a year in prison or house arrest—$6
million and $3 million, respectively—and the decision to ignore the costs
to defendants of providing injunctive relief,34 products, discounts, or
coupons as part of settlements.35 Given the disparity between our conclusions about private and DOJ criminal enforcement, however, even a significantly more conservative approach would yield the same ultimate
conclusion. For example, only if prison were disvalued at more than $43
to $48 million per year on average would the DOJ cases result in more
deterrence than the forty private cases.36
Our twenty newly analyzed private cases provide a larger sample
for analysis. One way to take advantage of this new information is to
update our original calculations. For example, we have now recorded an
additional $1.828 billion, valued as of 2011, in recoveries during the period from 1990 to 2007. This addition increases the total recovery during
that period to $24.2–$26.2 billion. This increase means that the DOJ
breakeven points calculated in the last paragraph—for example, a year in
prison would have to be valued at $43–$48 million in order for the DOJ
cases to result in more deterrence—should be increased appropriately.37
Alternatively, an updated analysis allows us a longer period in
which we can compare the deterrence effects of private and DOJ cases
(the original 1990–2007 period now extends through 2011). From 1990
through 2011, the total of DOJ corporate antitrust fines, individual fines,
and restitution payments totaled $8.18 billion.38 Valuing each year of
prison at $6 million and each year of house arrest at $3 million adds another $3.588 billion in total deterrence from DOJ’s anti-cartel cases. 39
This combined DOJ deterrence totals approximately $11.7 billion. This
is an extremely impressive figure and no doubt has deterred a substantial
amount of collusion. The DOJ total is, however, significantly less than

34. As noted earlier, injunctive relief secured by these forty cases also was omitted, further
understating the deterrence value of these cases. However, the effects of injunctive relief secured by
DOJ cases were also excluded. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 890.
35. In defending against either a private suit or a DOJ criminal action, corporations also incur
legal costs and suffer disruption. Because of this commonality we ignored these factors in our analysis.
36. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 340.
37. These numbers result from increasing the private recovery in our original analysis by an
additional $1.828 billion. See id. at 314 & n.89.
38. See infra Appendix Table A18.
39. Total incarceration for antitrust offenses from 1990 through 2011 was 539.18 years, see
infra Appendix Table A16, which we value at $6 million per year. This totals $3,235 billion. Other
confinement totals 117.69 years, see infra Appendix Table A17, which we value at $3 million per
year. This totals another $353 million. Together, both total $3.588 billion.
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the $34–$36 billion resulting from the sixty private cases from the same
period.40
Even a marked increase in the deterrence value of a prison sentence
does not alter the result. For example, instead of our assumed disvalue of
$6 million for a year in prison, one could use an estimated deterrence
value of $12 million for a year in prison, and $6 million for the deterrence effects of a year of house arrest instead of our $3 million assumption.41 Doing this would raise the total estimate of deterrence from the
DOJ criminal enforcement program from 1990 to 2011 from $11.7 billion to $15.4 billion—an impressive figure, but one that is still only approximately half as large as the $34–$36 billion secured by the sixty private cases. It would take an extreme revaluation of the value for the deterrence effects of the Antitrust Division’s entire anti-cartel program
from 1990 to 2011 to equal the deterrence effects of the sixty large private cases. Only if the deterrence effect of prison was an incredible $40–
$45 million per year on average, and the deterrence effects of house arrest were half this large, would the DOJ anti-cartel program produce as
much deterrence as these sixty private cases.42
Thus, the conclusion we arrived at following our comparative analysis of the forty large antitrust cases has been reinforced: private enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than even the
venerated DOJ anti-cartel program.43
C. Indicia of the Merits of the Cases
The preceding compensation and deterrence analysis implicitly assumes that the cases being studied had merit. After all, compensation is
only a virtue if those who recover actually are “victims.” If the cases are
without merit, plaintiffs deserve nothing, and any recoveries under these
circumstances would be unwarranted and unfair. Similarly, any analysis
40. Since some of the private cases were follow-ups to DOJ actions, however, we repeat our
qualification that some portion of the deterrence from these private actions fairly could be ascribed
to the initial DOJ investigation, and vice-versa. See supra note 30.
41. If we were to use $12 million for the value of a year in prison and $6 million for a year of
house arrest, the deterrence value of the prison and incarceration would double to $7.186 billion.
42. The total corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution from every DOJ case from this
period together total $8.18 billion. This means that the private total ($34–$36 billion) would have to
be offset by the public financial total ($8.18 billion) plus the effects of prison and house arrest,
which means that prison and house arrest would have to offset roughly $26 to $28 billion.
If 539.18 years of prison were disvalued at $40 to $45 million per year, this would equal $21.56 to
$24.56 billion. If 117.69 years of house arrest disvalued at half this, $20 to $22.5 million per year,
this would equal another $2.353 to $2.646 billion. Together these total $24.09 to $26.911 billion.
Added to the $8.18 billion total for corporate, individual fines and restitution, this equals $32.27 to
$35.091 billion—roughly the same as the private totals of $34 to $36 billion.
43. For caveats and qualifications, see Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 345–48.
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of the deterrence effects of antitrust sanctions proceeds under the implicit
or explicit assumption that the cases under examination were valid. Punishing innocent corporations would do little or nothing to discourage anticompetitive behavior,44 and would, for many reasons, be against the
public interest.
As a predicate for this inquiry, a jurisprudential issue warrants
some attention. It is difficult to develop an objective measure of merit for
purposes of an empirical analysis. If merit means that in some sense the
plaintiffs in an antitrust case should prevail, it would seem that a substantive analysis of claims would be necessary to determine whether they are
meritorious. The study would then require an extensive foray into antitrust law, as well as extremely contestable judgments about how controversial areas of doctrine should be interpreted and how factual disputes
should have been resolved.
To avoid this quagmire, we rely for present purposes on a legal positivist understanding of the law—one that relies on prediction, not prescription.45 According to this view, one might say that a claim has merit
if it stands a substantial probability of success. No inquiry is necessary
into whether the plaintiff should win.46
Using this definition, the cases we studied on the whole likely had
significant merit. First, most of the cases resulted in substantial settlements. The recovery in only a few cases was significantly less than $50
million, and the smallest was $30 million. It seems unlikely that defendants would pay such large sums merely, for example, to avoid the costs
of litigation. Only the meaningful prospect of losing litigation could explain settlements for such large amounts. We are highly skeptical about
claims that defending these suits often costs innocent firms $10 million
44. Indeed, liability for innocent conduct may well undermine deterrence of illegal behavior, as
liability serves as a deterrent only if it can be avoided by abiding by the law. Random liability—
imposed equally on legal and illegal conduct—would not discourage illegal behavior at all.
45. Holmes provided a seminal articulation of this approach, “The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law.” Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897). For a more philosophically
sophisticated positivist position—one in part critical of Holmes’s approach—see, e.g., BRIAN
LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 59–80 (2007).
46. Of course, no litigation system can be perfect. Every system of litigation will result in
errors. The crucial point for policy purposes is the frequency and severity of these errors. Ideally, we
would balance errors of over enforcement with errors of under enforcement—a balance of Type I
errors and Type II errors. Type I errors are cases where courts incorrectly sanction conduct that was
not anticompetitive. A Type II error is an instance of anticompetitive conduct that is not sanctioned.
In addition, public policy also should consider A Type III error, which is the transaction costs to
businesses, enforcers, consumers and decision-makers of implementing a policy, includes the litigation costs and the effects of risk and uncertainty. For a discussion of the Type I/Type II/Type III
terminology in an antitrust context, see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1582, 1670 (1983).
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or more, except in the most unusual cases. Regardless, $50 million
should be well above the nuisance value of an unmeritorious case. Moreover, the majority of the cases we studied (thirty-six out of sixty) settled
for more than $100 million.47 Because actions that settle for more than
$50 million are not nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect
the defendants’ perception that they could well lose on the merits at trial
and on appeal.
Second, most of the cases we studied were validated in whole or in
part by methods other than the final settlement in private litigation. For
the original forty cases, this validation took various forms:
1. In thirteen of the forty cases (32.5%), defendants or their employees were subject to criminal penalties, generally through guilty
pleas;
2. In twelve of the forty cases (30%), government enforcers obtained a civil recovery, usually in the form of a consent order;
3. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), plaintiffs survived or prevailed
on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment);
4. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), defendants lost at trial in the
private litigation or in a closely related case;
5. In at least three out of forty cases (7.5%), plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss.48

In sum, thirty-four of the original forty cases (85%) had at least one
indicator that the case was meritorious. Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes this information. Appendix Table A3 lists the specific cases in
which the merits received each kind of validation.
We found similar results in our additional twenty cases, although
we expanded our analysis of the criteria in a couple of ways. The information we obtained is as follows:
1. In five of the twenty cases (25%), defendants or their employees
were subject to criminal penalties, generally through guilty pleas;
2. In five of the twenty cases (25%), government enforcers obtained
a civil recovery, often in the form of a consent order;
47. It is difficult for a business to believably claim, in effect: “We are saints who did absolutely
nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100 million or more just to make the case go
away.” While we are not asserting this can never happen, this argument loses credibility as the settlements get higher.
48. In fact, the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss may be
higher. We did not consistently note this aspect of the litigation in the original forty cases we studied. The percentages appear to total more than 100% because eight of the forty cases involved more
than one basis for validation.
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3. In five of the twenty cases (25%), plaintiffs survived or prevailed
on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment
or judgment as a matter of law);
4. In four of the twenty cases (20%), defendants lost at trial in the
private litigation or in a closely related case;
5. In eleven out of twenty cases (55%), plaintiffs survived a motion
to dismiss;49
6. In eleven out of twenty cases (55%), a court certified a class for
purposes of litigation.

In sum, at least one indicator was present in nineteen out of the twenty
new cases (95%). Even if one excludes denials of a motion to dismiss
and certification of a litigation class, fourteen out of twenty (70%) of the
cases had such indicia. Table A4 in the Appendix explains the basis for
this validation.
As to the twenty new cases, we think the higher number—the 95%
validation rate—is likely the more appropriate measure because our original study gave limited attention to motions to dismiss and did not consider class certification at all. But recent legal developments suggested a
change in approach. As to motions to dismiss, courts have become more
demanding on plaintiffs.50 Although the current standard for whether a
complaint states a claim is murky (to say the least), it seems safe to say
that in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly51 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,52 courts have begun using
specificity in pleading as a gauge of whether a plaintiff’s claims have
merit.53 A court order denying a motion to dismiss is therefore a stronger
indication than it was in the past of the probable validity or seriousness
of a lawsuit.54 The same is true for class certification. Courts have become more willing to gauge the merits in deciding whether to certify a
class.55 Indeed, a court may be more exacting regarding proof of the mer49. This does not, of course, mean that the other 50% failed to survive a motion to dismiss. It
only means that such a motion was not made.
50. See Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 356, 369–74
(2009) [hereinafter Questionable Innovation]; see also Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust,
Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 969, 978–81 (2010)
[hereinafter Politics of Procedure].
51. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
52. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
53. See Politics of Procedure, supra note 50, at 979.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 976–78; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.
2008); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Car Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir.
2008).
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its at class certification than at summary judgment.56 Certification of a
class for purposes of litigation therefore has become a strong indication
that the claims in an action have a substantial evidentiary basis.
Third, a large number of the opinions among the forty original cases and the twenty new cases contain generous and gratuitous praise for
the plaintiffs’ counsel handling the case.57 For example, in Judge Nancy
G. Edmunds’s opinion approving the final settlement in the direct purchaser Cardizem case,58 she awarded class counsel their full request of
attorney’s fees—30% of the total recovery of $110 million—noting that
the award was justified by their “excellent performance on behalf of the
Class in this hotly contested case.”59 Similarly, the Honorable Michael
M. Mihm, the judge who oversaw the In re High Fructose litigation,60
repeatedly praised class counsel:
I’ve said many times during this litigation that you and the attorneys
who represented the defendants here are as good as it gets. Very
professional. . . . You’ve always been cutting to the chase and not
wasting my time or each others’ time or adding to the cost of the litigation. And this was very difficult litigation. . . . Skill and efficiency of the attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and duration of
the litigation. It was very complex. We made some new law on
more than one occasion. . . .61

Chief Judge Thomas Hogan in one of the vitamins cases stated in his
opening remarks to the jury pool: “[T]his is a very challenging and interesting case . . . involving, I think, some of the finest business litigating
lawyers or litigation-type lawyers in the country that are before you that
you will have the privilege to listen to.”62 After the jury returned a verdict of $49.5 million in damages for the class plaintiffs, Chief Judge Hogan thanked the jurors for their service and stated: “[T]his is a serious

56. See Politics of Procedure, supra note 50, at 969 (noting that courts at times now find facts
in deciding class certification, something they are permitted to do under the summary judgment
standard).
57. The evaluations of counsels’ work on the original forty cases are from Lande & Davis,
Benefits, supra note 5, at 903–04.
58. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
59. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 537–38 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (granting
Sherman Act class plaintiffs’ motions for final approval of settlement, attorney’s fees and expenses,
and incentive awards for named plaintiffs), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
60. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
61. Transcript of Record at 45–46, In re High Fructose, 936 F. Supp. 530 (No. 95-1477). He
accordingly awarded class counsel 25% of the settlement fund in fees, in addition to costs, the precise amount that class counsel requested. Id.
62. Transcript of Record at 25:1–6, In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. v. BASF AG, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6869 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 1285).
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case, and you had the pleasure of having very excellent lawyers on both
sides appear before you.”63
Attorneys in the new cases earned similar praise. In Air Cargo
Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation,64 Judge John Gleeson explained
that plaintiffs’ counsel had won a “hard-fought” battle for benefits for the
plaintiffs, and the litigation was “irrefutably complex.” The $85 million
settlement sum was “a result that compares favorably to settlements
reached in other price-fixing antitrust class actions” and was reasonable
in light of “the best possible recovery.”65 In noting the “highly experienced” attorneys’ “vigorous” negotiation on behalf of the plaintiffs,
Judge Gleeson stated, “Settlement Counsel has been consistently commended in the case deservedly so.”66 Judge Diamond, in certifying a litigation class for In re OSB Antitrust Litigation,67 noted that “[t]o date,
Lead and Co-Lead Counsel have vigorously and capably prosecuted this
extremely demanding litigation, and I am satisfied they will continue to
do so.”68 Further, when finally approving the settlement plan Judge Diamond reiterated: “Class counsel have represented their clients with consummate skill and efficiency, bringing this massive matter to conclusion
in less than three years.”69

63. Id. at 1520:8–10. There are numerous other examples of complimentary remarks. E.g., In
re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 03-0085(FSH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013, at
*37 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005) (“The settlement entered with Defendants is a reflection of Class Counsel’s skill and experience.”); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 (D. Mass. 2005) (The
court lauded “the exceptional efforts of class counsel” and pointed out that the settlement was “the
result of a great deal of very fine lawyering on behalf of the parties.”); In re Auto Refinishing Paint
Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004)
(“Plaintiffs’ counsel have repeatedly demonstrated their skill in managing” the litigation.); In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2004 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004) (The
court made repeated comments to the effect that “the lawyering in the case at every stage was superb.”); Final Approval Hearing Transcript at 34:2–3, In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d
363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Let me say that the lawyers in this case have done a stupendous job.”). California Attorney General Bill Lockyer praised private counsel in El Paso, noting they “were well
financed and expert litigators, bringing particular credibility to the [settlement] negotiations,” and
stating, “Class counsel were crucial to bringing [the settlement] to fruition.” Forty Case Studies,
supra note 6, at 87 (El Paso case summary).
64. In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2011 WL 2909162, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011).
65. In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2009 WL 3077396, at
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (Judge Gleeson’s memorandum and order approving Lufthansa settlement).
66. Id. at *28.
67. In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 2253419 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007).
68. Id. at *5.
69. Final Approval Order at 5, In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 2253419
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ospfeeallocationorder.pdf.
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Finally, in the tobacco litigation, DeLoach v. Philip Morris Cos.,70
Judge Osteen had high praise for Class Counsel: “Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead
Counsel . . . faced the daunting task of litigating against an industry that
is one of the most ardently protective of its rights and well-represented in
the nation with no guarantee that their investments of time and effort
would be repaid.”71 Judge Osteen also highlighted that “[t]his settlement
was the first class action antitrust settlement (and the largest class action
settlement of any kind) by these Defendants”72 and “the fact there were
no objections to the settlement and only 161 timely opt-outs testifies to
the value of the settlement in the eyes of the class.”73 Judge Osteen reserved special praise for the efforts of the plaintiffs’ attorneys:
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel reached this result without
the benefit of assistance from numerous other law firms. In many
similar cases, numerous law firms join the case by filing related actions that are eventually consolidated into a single case. The fact
that no additional firms joined this case may show that the legal
community thought this case against these defendants was untenable. It also reinforces the value of the settlement achieved for the
class given that Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel were not assisted by so
great a number of additional lawyers.74

Contrary to what some might expect, party affiliation does not indicate the likelihood of judicial praise for private antitrust attorneys. As to
the original forty cases, of the eight judges from whom we were able to
discover explicit and generous praise for the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys (in none of the cases did we discover criticism), five were appointed
by a Republican president.75 Similarly, two of the three judges who
praised plaintiffs’ counsel’s efforts in the new studies were appointed by
Republicans (again, we found no criticisms).
More generally, the party affiliation of the judges who presided
over the cases we studied perhaps provides a fourth and final reason to
believe that those cases were generally meritorious. The judges were appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents. This fact has
significance for various reasons. If the judges in the cases we studied
somehow were all ideologically aligned with plaintiffs’ attorneys, their
praise for the attorneys’ work would not mean as much. One could also
suspect—although the suspicion would be implausible—that the cases
70. No. 1:00-CV-1235, 2003 WL 5508762 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003).
71. Id. at *10.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 903–04 & tbl.10.
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succeeded only because of overly sympathetic judges. In other words,
judicial ideology rather than the merits might explain the relief private
plaintiffs obtained.
Further, even though almost all of the forty cases were settlements,
a federal judge approved all of the class action settlements as fair, reasonable, and adequate. While this certainly is not the same as a verdict,
this approval by a diverse and generally conservative76 group of federal
judges has some significance.77 We note that of the forty-five federal
judges who presided over part or all of the cases we studied, twentyseven were appointed by a Republican president.78 We also note that this
litigation occurred during an era when almost every Supreme Court antitrust decision has been decided in favor of the defendant. Fifteen of the
last sixteen antitrust decisions, by a Court rated by Judge Posner as the
most conservative since 1930,79 including every case except one80 decided after 1992, ruled against plaintiffs.81 Since this tide of pro-defendant
instruction effectively tells the lower courts how to decide close cases,
and given the high percentage of Republican-appointed judges presiding
in the litigation we studied, one would not expect praise of the plaintiffs’
attorneys’ work, undue fear by defendants and their counsel of a biased
76. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study 6–7, 18, 46 tbl. 3 (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Online Working Paper No. 404, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126403. They conclude that the current Supreme Court is the most conservative since at least 1930.
77. We do not mean to put undue weight on this point. Judges are supposed to protect class
members—not defendants—in approving class action settlements. So a judge’s approval of a class
action settlement does not necessarily mean it was meritorious. Indeed, just about any settlement
should warrant approval if a class action lacks any merit. Still, judges can make settlement difficult
if they believe plaintiffs have pursued a class action with no basis in law or evidence.
78. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, tbl.10.
79. See Landes & Posner, supra note 76.
80. See Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Book Ends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical
Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (Fall 2007). After Professor Gavil published his article the American
Needle case was decided for plaintiff. American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct.
2201 (2010).
81. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (9–0 in the judgment, 5–4 in regard to the Court’s opinion); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007) (5–4 decision); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (7–1
decision); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (7–2 decision); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Ross-Simmons Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (9–0 decision); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink,
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (8–0 decision); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (8–0 decision);
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (7–2 decision); F.
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (8–0 decision); U.S. Postal Serv. v.
Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004) (9–0 decision); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (9–0 decision); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756 (1998); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see Gavil, supra note 80, at 22
(“The last clear plaintiffs’ victories in the Court occurred in 1992 in two cases, [Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)] and [FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)].”).
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judge, or approval of the class action settlements based on any preexisting excessive judicial sympathy for plaintiffs’ attorneys.82
Each of these reasons is evidence, but not proof, that these private
antitrust cases involved anticompetitive behavior. Ultimately, there is no
obvious way to prove or fully refute assertions that many or most private
cases are unmeritorious and are tantamount to extortion. We submit,
however, that the above analysis should at a minimum give rise to a presumption—perhaps even a strong presumption—that the cases involved
legitimate claims. There is no evidence, moreover, to believe the opposite.
D. Recoveries by Direct Purchasers, Indirect Purchasers,
and Competitors
An interesting shift between the original study and the new study
concerns the kind of plaintiff pursuing the litigation. In the original
study, direct purchaser actions predominated. Thirty-two of the forty
cases involved direct purchasers, six involved indirect purchasers, and
six involved competitors. Direct purchasers recovered between $12 billion and $13.5 billion compared to $1.8 billion for indirect purchasers
and between $4 billion and $4.3 billion for competitors.83
The complexion of the new study is different. As shown in Table 2
below, eleven of the twenty new cases involved direct purchasers, four
involved indirect purchasers, six involved competitors, and two involved
sellers. While the number of cases involving direct purchasers remained
dominant, the margin has narrowed. But in the new study the recoveries
in the competitor cases total almost $9 billion, whereas the direct purchasers recovered cumulatively less than $1 billion, the indirect purchasers recovered $150 million, and the sellers (a new category of plaintiffs)
recovered $345 million.

82. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, tbl.10. We do not mean to suggest that judges
act on crass political commitments in presiding over litigation or that party affiliation correlates
perfectly with attitudes toward plaintiffs in class actions. Our point is that our analysis is supported
to the extent party affiliation might serve as an extremely crude and rough check on whether the
judges in the cases we studied were unduly sympathetic to class counsel’s efforts.
83. Id. at 899–900. These numbers add to more than forty because a single case can involve
more than one kind of plaintiff.
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Table 2: Recoveries by Category of Plaintiff ($s million)
Case

Direct
Purchaser
67.6
278
22.5
30

3M
Air Cargo
De Beers
Electrical
Carbon Fiber
EPDM
High Pressure
Laminates
Intel
MDL
Methionine
MSG
Mylan
Novell
OrthoBiotech
Polyester
Staple
Scrap Metal
Tobacco
Tricor
Visa MC
Warfarin

33
107
123.4
35

Total

1,161

112
41

Indirect
Purchaser

Competitor

Seller

68.5
272.5

5.2
1250

35
536
200

61
34.5
310
250

65.7
6813
44.5
378

8944

344.5

It is difficult to know whether the original study, the new study, or
a combination of the two is more likely to be representative of private
actions as a whole. Perhaps the two large competitor cases in the new
study—Intel84 and, especially, Visa/MasterCard85—distorted our new
findings as to the amount of recoveries that went to the different types of
plaintiffs. Alternatively, perhaps cases like Intel and Visa/MasterCard
help to correct for the bias in our analysis toward class actions, which are
easier to analyze because they are a matter of public record. In any case,
taking the two studies together, direct purchasers and competitors recov84. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 05-1717-JJF, 2005 WL
1838069 (D. Del. 2007).
85. See infra note 151.
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ered about equal amounts, even though direct purchasers participated in
forty-three of the sixty cases and competitors in only twelve.
E. Recoveries from Foreign Violators of U.S. Law
In addition to the total amount of recovery gained through private
enforcement of the antitrust laws, it is also of significance to note whom
the awards were recovered against. Not only is the total recovery of more
than $30 billion significant, but so is the fact that a substantial portion of
the recoveries came from foreign lawbreakers. Without private enforcement of the antitrust laws, these foreign actors could have preyed on participants in the U.S. economy and retained almost all of their spoils.86
In regard to recoveries from foreign entities, the two studies reflect
an interesting disparity. In the first study, a much larger proportion of the
overall recovery came from foreign corporations. In the original forty
cases, an amount between $5.7 and $7 billion of the total of $18 to $19.6
billion (not adjusting for inflation) was recovered from foreign corporations. In other words, about one-third of the recoveries were by victims
of foreign violators of the antitrust laws. In the twenty additional cases,
we were able to identify with confidence only $394 million that was recovered from foreign actors, as indicated in Appendix Table A4. An additional $591 million was recovered from corporate families that include
both foreign and U.S. entities, but we could not determine the source of
recovery, as shown in Appendix Table A5. In the new study, then, in total only $394 to $985 million—between 4% and 9%—was recovered
from foreign actors.
This disparity can perhaps be explained in various ways. First, it
may be possible that the huge Vitamins antitrust litigation skewed our
initial analysis. That case by itself was responsible for $3.9 billion to
$5.3 billion in recovery from foreign actors. Second, the Visa/MasterCard antitrust case—which did not involve foreign actors—
may have distorted the results of our new study in the opposite direction.
It accounted for almost $7 billion of the total of slightly over $11 billion
in recoveries we evaluated. Third, the additional twenty cases involve on
the whole more recent litigation, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act in F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.87 and the reading of that opinion by some
lower courts may have increased the difficulty for U.S. plaintiffs to re86. Foreign lawbreakers might also have returned some of their overcharges through DOJ
restitution actions, FTC disgorgement actions, or state parens patria actions. See generally supra
note 20. Although we have not attempted to ascertain the amounts involved, we believe they are
likely to be small compared to the amounts recovered in private cases.
87. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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cover from foreign actors.88 The consequence may be that U.S. victims
of foreign anticompetitive behavior are having a progressively more difficult time prevailing in court.
F. Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Mixed Cases
An interesting and surprising result from the new study—one that
finds significant confirmation in the first study—is that a substantial portion of private recoveries occurred in cases subject to the rule of reason,
as well as in cases in which it was unclear whether the rule of reason or a
per se rule would apply. In the new study, over $9 billion was recovered
in rule of reason cases, $619 million in pure per se cases, and $580 million in mixed cases. These numbers are reflected below in Tables 3, 4,
and 5. In other words, the vast majority of the recovery was in rule of
reason cases. Even if one eliminates the potentially distorting effect of
the huge Visa/MasterCard antitrust litigation—a rule of reason case—the
total recovery in rule of reason cases remains $2 billion, more than triple
the recovery in either pure per se cases or mixed cases and larger than
those two categories combined.
Table 3: Recoveries in Rule of Reason Cases
Case
3M
Intel
MDL
Lorazepam & Clorazepate
(Mylan)
Novell v. Microsoft
Tricor
Visa MC
Warfarin

Recovery ($s Millions)
136
1250
33
70

Total

9199

536
316
6813
44.5

88. But see Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (reversing a panel opinion reading the FTAIA to restrict lawsuits in the United States).
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Table 4: Recoveries in Per Se Cases
Case
Air Cargo
De Beers
Electrical Carbon Fiber
EPDM
High Pressure Laminates
Methionine
MSG
OSB
Polyester Staple
Scrap Metal

Recovery ($s Millions)
278
295
30
107
46
107
123.4
120.7
61
34.5

Total

1203

Table 5: Recoveries in Mixed Cases (Mix of Per Se and Rule of Reason)
Case
Ortho Biotech
Tobacco

Recovery ($s Millions)
200
310

Total

510

The first study involved a higher, but not overwhelming, proportion
of per se cases: somewhat over $8 billion in recovery in rule of reason
cases, somewhat over $9–$10 billion in pure per se cases and somewhat
over a billion and a half dollars in mixed cases.89 The split, then, was
almost even between pure per se cases and those that involved the rule of
reason, and slightly less than half the recoveries came in cases involving
only the rule of reason.
Combining the two studies, we find that pure rule of reason cases
predominated. Over $17 billion of the more than $30 billion in total recoveries came in rule of reason cases, and over $2 billion came in mixed
cases, leaving only about $10 billion—or a third of the total—in pure per
se cases.
These outcomes upset the standard view. A commonly held understanding is that rule of reason cases so rarely succeed that they are not
worth bringing. Consider the empirical work of Professor Michael Carrier. In 2009, he analyzed every final judgment in federal court involving a
rule of reason claim that he could find from February 2, 1999, to May 5,
89. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 912–14.

2013]

Private Antitrust Enforcement

1291

2009.90 He concluded that defendants won 221 of 222 cases.91 Among
his other interesting conclusions was that “plaintiffs almost never win
under the rule of reason.”92
A difficulty for his study in this regard, however, is that he analyzed only judicial rulings producing final judgments. Most cases settle
before a final judgment. Moreover, judicial rulings are likely to result in
final judgments in cases where defendants win. A court can enter a final
judgment if it grants a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a
defendant’s favor. But if it denies such a motion, ruling for a plaintiff,
the litigation simply continues, often leading to settlement rather than
trial. Indeed, as Professor Carrier acknowledged, “Nearly all of
the . . . cases [he analyzed] involve[d] courts’ grants of summary judgment and motions to dismiss.”93
Professor Carrier’s study would capture success by plaintiffs only if
they won at trial or in the unlikely event they obtained a favorable final
judgment by motion for judgment on the pleadings, motion for summary
judgment, or the like. Moreover, Carrier considered final judgments after
trial only if the rule of reason analysis was conducted by a judge, not a
jury.94 Given that plaintiffs have a right to try antitrust cases for damages
before juries, it is unsurprising that Professor Carrier found only one case
in which plaintiffs prevailed. His methodology would be expected to
eliminate almost every manner in which plaintiffs would be expected to
win.95
Due to these methodological problems, Professor Carrier’s conclusion that plaintiffs almost always lose rule of reason cases does not necessarily follow from his analysis. In a significant proportion of rule of
reason cases, plaintiffs may survive far enough into litigation to obtain
settlements, perhaps even substantial settlements. But without further
empirical inquiry, that possibility would be just a matter of theory. The
cases Professor Carrier eliminated could resemble the cases he analyzed.
90. Michael Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 828–29 (2009).
91. Id. at 830.
92. Id. We discuss only this finding, even though his analysis also addressed other interesting
issues regarding which he reached valuable conclusions.
93. Id. at 829.
94. Carrier took this approach because the focus of his interest was on the structure of rule of
reason analysis. Id. at 827. Note that if judges reason in a systematically different way when they
rule in favor of plaintiffs rather than defendants, Carrier’s exclusive focus on final judgments may
also undermine his conclusions about the structure of the rule of reason analysis in federal court. We
mean to express no view, however, on this issue.
95. Professor Carrier did not, however, eliminate every possible way, as is demonstrated by the
bench trial and appeal in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), the one loss
by defendants that Carrier identified. See Carrier, supra note 90, at 831.
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Our empirical work provides evidentiary support for the proposition
that plaintiffs succeed more often in rule of reason cases than has been
recognized. Again, we make no claim that the cases we studied were typical. But the fact that those cases show plaintiffs recovering more in rule
of reason cases than in pure per se cases—a total recovery of more than
$20 billion in the rule of reason cases—suggests that a rule of reason
analysis is not necessarily fatal to plaintiffs. This upsets conventional
wisdom.
G. The Relationship Between Private and Public Enforcement
The twenty new cases we studied cast further light on the relationship between private and public enforcement. As reflected in Table 6
below, in ten of the twenty newly studied cases, private enforcement was
not preceded by government action. Although this number represents
50% of the cases we studied, it reflects only about 11% (slightly over
$1.2 billion of the $10.7 billion) of the total amounts recovered.
Table 6: Private Litigation Not Preceded by Government Action
Case
3M
High Pressure Laminates
MDL v. Hoffman
Methionine
MSG
Ortho Biotech
OSB
Tricor
Warfarin

Recovery ($s Millions)
136
46
33
107
123.4
200
120.7
316
44.5

Total

1127

As with the original forty cases, the rest of the story is more complicated. Intel, for example, was primarily a government enforcement
action, but it also involved a complex and murky interplay between public and private efforts at enforcement.96 Further, as indicated in Table 7
below, private action obtained significantly greater relief than government enforcement in three cases. Taking into account these additional
four cases, in total private enforcement in twelve of the twenty cases—

96. See Twenty New Cases, supra note 11.
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accounting for $8.36 billion of the $10.7 billion in recovery—constituted
more than a mere tagalong to government enforcement.
Table 7: Private Recoveries That Were Significantly More Inclusive
Than Government Enforcement Action (In Addition to All of the Compensation to Victims Noted in Table I) (Does Not Include the Cases in
Table 6 That Were Not Preceded by Government Action)
Case

Recovery
($s Millions)

EPDM

107

Tobacco

310

Visa MC

6813

Total

7230

Reasons Why Private
Remedy Was Significantly Broader than
Government Remedy
Government investigations but no legal action
Government investigation but no legal action
Government action provided only injunction
whereas private actions
provided compensation

H. Attorney’s Fees
As in our original study, we found an inverse relationship between
the size of a recovery and the percentage of the recovery awarded as attorney’s fees. Although fee awards varied significantly within each category, in the twenty newer cases counsel tended to recover approximately
30% to 33.3% in cases with recoveries below $100 million and a similar
or smaller percentage in cases with recoveries between $100 and $500
million, with the percentage generally declining as the recovery increased. A notable exception to this rule is the Tricor case, with a 33.3%
award and a recovery of $316 million. It should be stressed, however,
that these percentages ignore any injunctive or non-monetary relief obtained by plaintiffs, or the value of the legal precedent established by the
case. To the extent that these could be valued, the legal fees expressed as
a percentage of the recoveries should be lowered from the values reported here, perhaps dramatically.
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Table 8: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney’s Fees for
Recoveries Less than $100 Million
Case ($s million in recovery)
3M
Electrical Carbon Fiber
High Pressure Laminates
MDL
Mylan (Lorazepam & Clorazepate)
(direct)
Polyester
Scrap Metal
Warfarin

Attorney’s Fees Percentage
37 (Bradburn); 27.4 (Meijer)
25–33.3
33.3
33.3
30
32
2197
24

Table 9: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney’s Fees for
Recoveries Between $100 Million and $500 million
Case ($s million in recovery)
Air Cargo (Lufthansa)
De Beers
EPDM
Methionine
MSG
OrthoBiotech
OSB
Tobacco (Deloach v. Philip
Morris)
Tricor
3m v. Meijer

Attorney’s Fee Percentage
15
25
21.7–33.3
23.3
19
Unknown
33.3
27
33.3
Unknown

Table 10: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney’s Fees for
Recoveries Exceeding $500 Million
Case ($s million in recovery)
Intel
Novell v. Microsoft
Visa MC

Attorney’s Fee Percentage
Unknown
16.4
Unknown

We were able to ascertain the attorney’s fees in forty-five of the
sixty large private cases we studied. The fees averaged either 14.3% or
97. This percentage may be misleading as the initial attorney’s fee award from settlement was
30% and the ultimate award was 21% of treble damages after trial (64% of single damages). See
Twenty New Cases, supra note 11.

2013]

Private Antitrust Enforcement

1295

25.6%, depending on whether a weighted or unweighted average is used
because larger cases tend to produce attorney’s fees that are a lower percentage of the settlement.98 These results were slightly larger than the
results of an earlier study using a different sample, which found mean
legal fees of 21.02% and median fees of 9.15% in antitrust class action
cases.99 As noted earlier, these percentages ignore the value of the injunctive relief, non-monetary recoveries, and precedent secured by the
litigation.
Thus, the twenty new cases build on our earlier study to provide
powerful empirical corroboration that private antitrust enforcement has
provided valuable compensation and deterrence effects, in contravention
of the established wisdom. With our original conclusions reinforced, we
turn now to our specific response to the critiques of our previous work.
II. CRITICISMS OF OUR EARLIER STUDY AND OUR REPLY
It is perhaps only natural that our provocative position would be
subjected to criticisms. High-ranking officials at the DOJ have challenged our views on the relative deterrence effects of private and DOJ
antitrust enforcement, and a leading antitrust scholar, Professor Daniel
Crane of the University of Michigan Law School, has leveled a similar
criticism regarding our stance on compensation. The arguments they
make, however, at most temper our conclusions—indeed, they merely
confirm the cautions and qualifications we have already made. None of
the criticisms of our work survive scrutiny.
A. Criticisms Concerning Deterrence Issues
In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D.
Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett (WHB) challenge our analysis.100
They assert that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.”101 Although we understand and admire the instinct of these DOJ
employees to proclaim the superiority of the remedies secured by the fine
institution to which they have devoted many years of their lives, their
specific criticisms fail to undermine our conclusions. In their Antitrust
Bulletin article, WHB offer six separate critiques of our analysis, which
we now consider in turn.
98. See infra Appendix Tables A6 & A7.
99. We note the statistics in Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010). Table 5
contains statistics for seventy-one antitrust cases and finds mean fees of 21.02% and median fees of
9.15%. We believe these figures should be compared to our unweighted average of 25.4%.
100. See WHB, supra note 9, at 227–33.
101. Id. at 229.
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First, one of the items we included in the DOJ’s deterrence total
was the monetary equivalent of the 330.24 years that cartel defendants
were sentenced to prison during the eighteen-year period we studied.102
WHB complain that we use only $2 million as the deterrence value (or
disvalue) of a year in prison.103 They assert this figure is too low, but
never provide a higher figure they believe is acceptable.104 Moreover, the
only evidence they provide for their assertion that $2 million per year is
inadequate is their undocumented conclusion that “some” defendants
spend more than this in legal fees attempting to stay out of prison and
“some” would pay even more to escape prison outright.105
However, while our article analyzed a number of approximation
techniques to arrive at the estimate that a year of prison is “worth” no
more than $2 million,106 immediately after we did this—in the very next
paragraph—we tripled it to $6 million because of our stated desire to be
conservative and our belief that individual sanctions count more than
corporate sanctions.107 In other words, in the next paragraph we use $6
million as the equivalent value of a year in prison. We accordingly added
$6 million—not $2 million—times the number of years in prison to the
corporate fines and other monetary sanctions to arrive at a total of $7.737
billion for the deterrence value of DOJ enforcement. This is what we
compare to the private total.108 WHB also fail to mention our “flip” figure. We show that only if one disvalues a year in prison as greater than
$43–$48 million would DOJ anti-cartel enforcement deter more anticompetitive conduct than private enforcement. This number is based on
the deterrence effect of just the forty private cases we analyzed;109 we

102. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 336.
103. See WHB, supra note 9, at 229.
104. Id.
105. Id. WHB never provided specifics. For example, do they have evidence that individual
defendants frequently spend $5 million in legal fees in an attempt to avoid a potential two-year prison sentence? Or that some individual defendants have paid $10 million in legal fees when they might
face a five-year sentence? WHB presented only assertions.
106. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 335 n.72.
107. Id. at 336.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 340. Further, we compared the private total to an Antitrust Division total that, as
WHB concede on page 228 n.84, includes non-antitrust fines secured by the Antitrust Division.
WHB surely have access to non-public data showing how much of what the Division reports publically as “antitrust fines” in fact are related to other crimes that they uncovered during the course of
antitrust investigations. WHB should reveal how much of the fines that we, when we performed our
study using the data the Antitrust Division published, classified as “DOJ Antitrust fines” actually are
non-antitrust fines. Because we included these non-antitrust fines, our analysis was too favorable
towards finding a high amount of deterrence effects from DOJ antitrust activity.
Similarly, some of the prison time the publically available Antitrust Division statistics attribute
to antitrust offenses could have resulted from non-antitrust crimes, and not every prison sentence
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have since documented many hundreds of millions of additional dollars
that private actors recovered during the same period.110
We are as mystified over WHB’s criticism for our article allegedly
using $2 million as the value of a year in prison as we are curious as to
whether they believe that a year in prison on average should be disvalued
at more than $43–$48 million. After all, the issue is not the highest
amount any defendant would pay to avoid prison. For a general comparison, one should examine the value or disvalue of a year in prison to the
average potential antitrust violator. WHB provide no data on this issue.
For the reasons given in our article we believe that the figure we actually
used in our analysis—$6 million per year—is conservative and generous.111 Certainly WHB have done nothing to demonstrate that the figure
is too low.
Second, WHB complain that we do not value the stigma or lost future income from prison.112 We wish they had provided data on the significance or magnitude of this issue. If they had, we would be glad to
include it in our calculations.
In fact, we do have some preliminary, highly tentative evidence that
at least some, and perhaps as many as half, of convicted price fixers go
back to work in the same industry or even in the same firm after they are
released from prison.113 We also have evidence that sometimes the corporate attitude is that the person who went to prison “took a bullet for the
team” and for this reason should be re-hired after their release from prison, perhaps even at a higher salary.114 We also know of anecdotes, such
as that involving Alfred Taubman, showing little or no stigma or loss of
social status after release from prison for bid rigging.115
Maybe on average the future incomes and social status of convicted
price fixers decreases significantly. But maybe not. However, even if
their future income decreased by another $1 million for each year of imprisonment—a figure we strongly doubt—the actual figure we used as
the deterrence value of a year in prison, $6 million, should still be more
than high enough. Moreover, even if the deterrence value of prison were
increased to make up for lost future wages and social status, we find it
was served in full. We urge WHB to provide data that is as accurate as possible so we all could
perform a fairer DOJ/private comparison.
110. See supra Table 1.
111. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 335–36.
112. See WHB, supra note 9, at 229.
113. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for
Private Antitrust Enforcement 36 (July 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors);
see also John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 427 (2012).
114. See Connor & Lande, supra note 113, at 480.
115. Id. at 439 & n.44–45.
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inconceivable that a year of prison would have a total disvalue to an individual of more than the $43–$48 million required to “flip” our calculations. Only if the yearly deterrence from prison (including lost future
income and social status) on average exceeded $43–$48 million would
DOJ anti-cartel enforcement be found to deter more anticompetitive conduct than these forty private cases.
We urge WHB to perform a study of the issues they raise. We urge
WHB to study the stigma issue—What actually happens to social status
after price fixers are released from prison? How often do price fixers go
back to work for their old firms or for other firms in the same industry?
Are their salaries increased or decreased as a result of their imprisonment? Finally, we also urge DOJ to routinely include provisions in plea
agreements barring convicted price fixers from ever working in the same
industry in which they fixed prices.
Third, WHB state that our use of the standard optimal deterrence
model, which assumes risk neutrality, for entire cartels is inappropriate
because if the most risk-averse member of a cartel cracks, the cartel will
crack.116 For this reason the optimal deterrence target need only be the
most risk-averse member of a cartel.
This observation is interesting and correct. But it seems likely that
most cartelists are by nature risk seekers. After all, they form cartels even
though this subjects them to the risk of getting caught, tried, imprisoned,
fined, fired, and also subject to the lower social status and future income
that WHB assert are so significant. Accordingly, the appropriate focus of
an optimal deterrence calculation actually should be on the most riskaverse member of a risk-seeking group of cartel members. Is this person
or corporation a net risk neutral entity, a net risk avoider, or still a net
risk seeker? We do not know. Neither do WHB, who provide no data to
help analyze this issue.
WHB similarly contend that discouraging a single individual in a
single potential cartel member may suffice to prevent the illegal collusive
conduct.117 They also assert that criminal penalties may succeed if they
prevent firms with a substantial market share from violating the antitrust
laws, in part because it may suffice to discourage even a single potential
cartel member from participating.118
This point, however, applies equally to both criminal penalties and
to the civil liability that arises in private actions. It does not provide a
reason to conclude one is more effective at deterrence than the other.
Moreover, even if some members of some firms, or even some entire
116. See WHB, supra note 9, at 229–30.
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id. at 229–30.
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firms, decline to participate, the cartel nevertheless may still succeed in
raising prices. After all, to be largely successful, a cartel need not consist
of every firm in a market, much less every employee of every firm.
Fourth, WHB argue that we fail to give proper credit to the Antitrust Division for its role in recoveries:
Lande and Davis also are wrong to credit the entire deterrent effect
of damage recoveries to plaintiffs’ lawyers on the basis that the recovery would not have occurred without the efforts of plaintiffs’
lawyers. In fact the Antitrust Division does a great deal of the work
that results in damage recoveries.119

WHB would be right if we credited private plaintiffs with all the deterrence effects from these private cases. We did not. In fact, we explicitly
stated that credit should be shared:
The DOJ certainly should get partial credit for the private recoveries
obtained in any cases it uncovered or helped to uncover, even if the
private parties secured the bulk of the sanctions. Nevertheless, it
would not be fair to give the DOJ complete credit for any resulting
deterrence, because if there had been no private enforcement, this
deterrence never would have arisen. Rather, the fairest thing would
be to share credit for this deterrence between the public and private
enforcers.120

We believe that ten of the forty private cases we studied were follow-ons to DOJ enforcement efforts.121 This percentage is similar to that
obtained in the classic study by Kauper and Snyder, who found that no
more than 20% of all private antitrust cases followed DOJ cases.122 Even
if DOJ were given partial credit for 25% of the deterrence caused by the
forty private cases we studied, our overall conclusion would not change
significantly.
This is especially true because this relationship is, in some instances, reversed. Our case studies showed that private enforcement sometimes preceded—and thereby may have significantly assisted—DOJ enforcement.123 Indeed, even the much-lauded DOJ leniency program benefits from the threat of private enforcement. As WHB acknowledge, “One
inducement to apply for leniency, however, is the potential to significant-

119. Id. at 230.
120. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 347.
121. Id. at 346. For a discussion of our classification methodology, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 897–99.
122. For a brief discussion of the Kauper & Snyder study, see Comparative Deterrence, supra
note 6, at 346.
123. For an analysis of these issues, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 897–99.
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ly limit liability in damages suits.”124 In other words, the threat of private
enforcement helps to create the leverage necessary to induce antitrust
violators to confess to the DOJ.
For all these reasons, the relationship between DOJ and private enforcement is symbiotic. And, as a result, crediting private enforcement
for all the money it recovers would be inaccurate, as would crediting the
DOJ for all of the penalties it is able to impose through criminal enforcement. Our comparison, then, is a rough proxy that may err somewhat in either direction. The “true” ratio of private deterrence to DOJ
deterrence therefore might not be the simple result that followed from
our data: ($21.9–$23.9 billion in private sanctions)/($7.737 billion in
public sanctions),125 which equals a ratio that is roughly 3:1 in favor of
private deterrence. Whether the actual ratio is 2:1 or 4:1 is beside the
point; our article’s point is that the ratio for all private cases—not just the
forty that we studied—is “probably” greater than 1:1.
Fifth, WHB claim we assert private plaintiffs completely uncovered
the conduct responsible for two of the thirteen cartel-based recoveries in
our sample “with the government following the private plaintiffs lead or
playing no role at all.”126 WHB further state: “In fact the Antitrust Division did not ‘follow the private plaintiffs’ lead’ in prosecuting those cartels, and any suggestion that the Division ‘played no role at all’ is ridiculous.”127
However, WHB overlook the “or” in the first sentence they quote.
We never said the government played no role in these two cases. We said
only that the first evidence of collusion was uncovered by private parties.
In fact, we explicitly stated in our case summaries—which WHB cite—
that the government played an important role in both cases. But WHB
fight this “no role” straw man argument by showing that DOJ played an
important role.128 Our actual summaries of these cases give the government a great deal of credit.
When we decided whether DOJ or a private party took the “lead,”
an important piece of evidence was whether DOJ or a private party uncovered the first evidence of collusion (although of course much more is
necessary to prove liability). For example, our Vitamins analysis contained the caveat:

124. See WHB, supra note 9, at 233.
125. As noted earlier, this includes prison time valued at $6 million per year, not $2 million per
year. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 336.
126. See WHB, supra note 9, at 231.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 232–33.
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[M]any of the details of the Department of Justice investigation are
non-public, and it is clear that both private counsel and the U.S. Department of Justice were on parallel tracks and discovered much of
the critical evidence at around the same time, and that the investigation of each helped that of the other.129

Our analysis of the Vitamins case fairly relied on the report provided by David Boies, counsel for private plaintiffs. Boies reported that
when his firm found the first evidence of a cartel in February 1997 “there
was no pending federal investigation.”130 WHB never state that Boies is
incorrect or unreliable, but WHB do say that there had been an ongoing
federal investigation.131 However, we cited information that the DOJ investigation had stalled before private counsel provided them with important collusion evidence:
“U.S. investigators first got wind of the vitamins cartel and Roche’s
role in it in late 1996 from sources at ADM cooperating with the
DOJ in its investigation of the citric acid cartel . . .” As a result the
FBI interviewed Dr. Kumo Sommer, the head of Roche’s Vitamins
division, in March 1997. “Sommer denied the existence of any vitamin cartel, and the DOJ apparently decided to wind down its investigation for the meanwhile. . . .” However, “in late 1997, a partner of the law firm Boies & Schiller . . .” presented the DOJ with
evidence that a conspiracy was occurring.132

Moreover, in our Vitamins case study we wrote: “We attempted to find a
public account of the origin of the vitamins cases written by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division but could not. When we sent them the
version contained in this document they would not comment on its accuracy or completeness.”133 Further, on the crucial importance of the early
private suit we cited the following:
At the May 21, 1999 press conference in Basel, Switzerland announcing the Roche guilty pleas, Hoffman-La Roche’s CEO, Franz
Humer, explained how it was the early 1998 class action lawsuit
(and not a government investigation) that prompted a new internal
investigation that caused Roche to terminate its conspiratorial conduct and begin to cooperate with the government: “In 1997, responding to the settlement in the citric acid case and to the news of
an investigation of the bulk vitamins industry, Roche initiated an in129. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 237.
130. DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 231 (1st ed. 2004).
131. See WHB, supra note 9, at 232.
132. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 237 n.645 (quoting John M. Connor, supra note
24, at 25–26).
133. Id. at 236 n.642.
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ternal inquiry of its own, which at the time did not turn any evidence of wrongdoing. A second internal inquiry prompted by class
action lawsuits filed against Roche and other companies in early
1998 for alleged price-fixing in the bulk vitamins market revealed
that further action was needed. The inquiry was carried out in collaboration with U.S. experts. Internal measures were implemented
without delay to ensure an immediate halt to any antitrust violations. The findings this second inquiry formed the basis for Roche’s
decision to offer, on 1 March this year, its full cooperation in the US
Justice Department investigation.” (See Exh. 9 to Class Plaintiffs’
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Niacin and Biotin Defendants, at 3.)134

We therefore stand by our description of the Vitamins case as led by a
private party based on the evidence that was then—and is now—
available.
WHB fail to provide any evidence to support their argument related
to the second case involving a commercial explosives cartel. WHB assert:
Lande and Davis credit the detection of one other cartel to plaintiffs’ lawyers. They report that an explosives cartel was discovered
in the course of private litigation of a noncartel case. They do not
indicate when evidence of a cartel emerged, but they do indicate
that the antitrust claims leading to significant damage recovery were
filed in February and August 1996. But that was after the Division
had secured guilty pleas from the conspirators, and evidence uncovered in the private litigation did not prompt the Division’s investigation.135

Concerning this case we wrote the following: “This litigation and
the government investigation that followed apparently arose out of a
1992 private civil suit initiated by Thermex Energy Corporation
(Thermex), a Texas manufacturer of commercial explosives, against Atlas Powder Company, owned by Imperial Chemical Industries P.L.C. of
Britain (ICI).”136 Our case summary certainly gave DOJ a large share of
the credit for bringing this cartel to justice: “In September 1995, the Department of Justice secured guilty pleas and fines for two of the defendants in the Commercial Explosives litigation . . . .” 137
If a secret DOJ investigation uncovered evidence of collusion before the 1992 unrelated private action began, then this case should indeed
134. Id. at 239–40.
135. See WHB, supra note 9, at 232–33.
136. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 61.
137. Id. at 62.
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be removed from the list of cases where private enforcers first discovered
the evidence of collusion. But WHB have not provided this evidence.
Nor have they asserted that a DOJ investigation discovered evidence of
collusion before the 1992 private case. Further, we note WHB implicitly
concede that DOJ played no role at all in eleven of the thirteen cases in
this group by disputing our factual analysis of only two.
More generally, our article contained the caveats that “reasonable
people could dispute who first discovered some of the violations that
gave rise to the sample of 40 private cases” or which party actually took
the lead, and also that we could use only imperfect publicly available
data to perform our study.138 It is only natural for DOJ and the private
parties to see the facts differently—for both DOJ and the private parties
to see ambiguous facts in a way that tends to give themselves more of the
credit for uncovering and proving the violations at issue.139 Indeed, they
might not have always been aware of what the other lawyers were doing,
and so naturally assumed that they deserved the bulk of the credit.
Finally, WHB claim that after the Supreme Court’s recent Twombly
decision, private plaintiffs will be much more reliant on the DOJ to uncover and prosecute antitrust violations.140 This may well be true. But it
would not affect the results of our study, which covered the 1990–2007
period. Moreover, once sufficient time has passed the relative deterrence
effects of private and DOJ antitrust enforcement should be re-assessed
not by speculation, but on the basis of evidence. Indeed, the antitrust
world’s general failure to base policy on evidence has caused great mischief. Twombly itself was based on an empirical premise that was both
unsubstantiated and implausible—the assumption that the sorts of
wealthy and powerful corporations that are the subject of antitrust lawsuits often settle even meritless claims for huge sums.141
In conclusion, WHB provide no reason to doubt our article’s findings. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement “probably” deters more anticompetitive activity than the DOJ’s anti-cartel program
after comparing the deterrence effects of only forty of the many private
cases filed during an eighteen-year period with the deterrence from every
DOJ cartel case filed during the same period. A fortiori, the deterrence
effects from every private enforcement action might well have been
138. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 346.
139. WHB’s complaint over credit for two of the forty cases we studied helps prove the proverb, “Success has many fathers while failure is an orphan.”
140. See WHB, supra note 9, at 231.
141. See Politics of Procedure, supra note 50, at 969, 978–81; Questionable Innovation, supra
note 50, at 356, 369–74; see also Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (rejecting the argument that class actions constitute a
form of legalized blackmail).
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many times larger than that from the DOJ anti-cartel program. The new
case studies presented above demonstrate that our initial study was conservative, as was our overall conclusion that private enforcement “probably” deters more conduct than DOJ private enforcement.142
We stress that we did not perform this comparison to denigrate in
any manner the excellent work performed by the Antitrust Division, of
which we remain huge fans. Indeed, we would like to reemphasize that
private enforcement and public enforcement, on the whole, work wonderfully well together and in harmony toward the goal of promoting the
public interest.
Rather, we undertook our analysis to determine whether private enforcement is underappreciated and deserves a significant share of the
credit for deterring anticompetitive conduct. Although we appreciate that
WHB studied our article and we enjoy discussing the details of our analysis, we believe it would be more productive to focus instead on designing ways for private and public enforcement to cooperate to better approximate an optimal level of deterrence for anticompetitive conduct.
B. Criticisms Concerning Compensation Issues
The leading critic of our original study’s conclusions concerning
the compensation effects of private antitrust enforcement has been University of Michigan Law Professor Daniel Crane.143 Responding directly
to our past analysis, he asserted that private enforcement does not provide meaningful compensation to the victims of antitrust violations. His
overall claim could not be much more ambitious:
Efforts to correct the perceived infirmities of the U.S. private enforcement system by tweaking the mechanics of enforcement—
standing rules, discovery principles, claim aggregation mechanisms,
damages rules, and the like—are futile. The shortcomings of private
enforcement are existential, not technical. They go to foundational
142. In a related point, WHB argue that private litigation against small cartels often is not
viable. WHB, supra note 9, at 228 n.82. This is a fair point, and a reason to make private actions less
costly and therefore viable in a broader range of cases.
On the other hand, there are also a significant number of cases that the DOJ will not prosecute,
either because of a limited DOJ budget, because they are not the kinds of traditional cartel cases that
DOJ pursues, or because the odds of the DOJ prevailing are not sufficiently high. In fact, the extraordinary success rate of DOJ prosecutions suggests it is unwilling to take a significant risk of
losing in litigation, which means a substantial amount of illegal conduct will go unpunished. For a
discussion of these and related points, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 905–07.
In sum, DOJ criminal enforcement works better in some cases and private enforcement works
better in others. This is further evidence that public and private enforcement complement one another, both working in the direction of the public good.
143. See INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 10, at 168; Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2,
at 682–95.
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assumptions about the goals and purposes of antitrust law and competition policy. Private antitrust enforcement in the United States
has rarely advanced the two assumed goals of private antitrust enforcement: namely, deterrence and compensation.144

Professor Crane’s arguments, however, do not come close to supporting
his bold position. They suggest, at most, reasons to question whether private antitrust enforcement is as effective as it could be, not to declare it
“futile” and to deny the value of its very existence. Because Professor
Crane issued a direct challenge only to our analysis of the efficacy of
private enforcement as a means of providing compensation, we will address that portion of his argument in this Article.145
Professor Crane begins his argument by making the sweeping assertion that “issuing [class members] a check is often so expensive that
administrative costs swallow the entire recovery.”146 To support this
statement Professor Crane cites a single forty-one-year-old Posner article
that made a similar claim without empirical support.147 Nevertheless,
Professor Crane continues: “[A]fter lawyers’ fees and administrative fees
are accounted for, each consumer’s share of the recovery is negligible,
even though the harm to the class is great.”148 From this kind of statement one might think his conclusion was the result of an empirical survey of twenty cases in which, for example, the average legal fees of 33%
and average claims administration expenses of 50% left very little for
injured victims, such as only a few dollars each and perhaps only 20% of
the settlement fund. However, Professor Crane provides no empirical
evidence at all for his assertions.
As support Professor Crane cites only an article by Professor
Cavanagh, another highly respected scholar.149 Professor Cavanagh’s
article, in turn, provides only anecdotes and hypotheticals involving the
144. See INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 10, at 163; Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2,
at 676–77.
145. Professor Crane also argued that private enforcement does not help deter anticompetitive
conduct. Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 676–77. Since his deterrence argument was not directly
responsive to our research, however, we will explain on another occasion why it is similarly unpersuasive.
146. Id. at 683.
147. Id. at 683 n.30.
148. Id. at 683. Professor Crane’s remark may well reflect the conventional wisdom in antitrust. This belief was ably summarized by Professor Cavanagh: “Many class action suits generate
substantial fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing.” Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 214 (2005). Professor
Cavanagh, however, provides only an anecdote to support these conclusions. He makes no effort to
assess whether the types of settlements he describes are in fact “not atypical.” Id. He provides no
data to show how often antitrust class action cases result in useless remedies.
149. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 683 n.34 (citing Cavanagh, supra note 145, at
214).
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use of coupons, but not the size of any actual administrative costs. Further, Cavanagh does not offer any data on the size of legal fees or any
data concerning the frequency of coupon settlements. Neither scholar
provides data showing whether administrative costs average 50% of settlements or 5%. Nor do they offer data revealing whether legal fees average 15% or 33% or whether the residual for victims is 75% or 15%. The
difference is, however, crucial. Without evidentiary support, Professor
Crane’s assertion that legal fees and administrative fees “often swallow
the entire recovery” is simply an unsupported opinion that should not be
given any weight. The limited information we have been able to assemble, moreover, suggests that his opinion is unlikely to be correct.
As noted above, we were able to ascertain the attorney’s fees in forty-five of the sixty large private cases we studied. The mean fees averaged somewhere between 14% (if a weighted average is used) to 26%
(using an unweighted average, thus giving each case equal weight).150 If
we are trying to gauge the total amount of compensation that reached the
plaintiffs, the weighted average would be more appropriate because it
weighs more heavily the larger settlements—which have a larger effect
on compensation and involve a lower percentage allocated to attorney’s
fees.
We did not attempt to ascertain the costs of administering the settlement funds when we analyzed the sixty large private cases in our
study. Moreover, even though the required information is a matter of
public record, it has been difficult to convince busy attorneys or claims
administrators to spend time searching their files for the relevant material. We were, however, able to find two claims administration firms, Rust
Consulting and Class Action & Claims Solutions, 151 who were willing to
assemble and supply relevant data from their recent cases. The thirty-one
results they supplied are instructive, although they were for the most part
unwilling to identify the cases at issue. We separately obtained information about the Visa/MasterCard case. 152 The following Table summarizes the data:

150. See supra Tables 4, 5 & 6.
151. We are extremely grateful to Rust Consulting and to Class Action & Claims Solutions for
this information.
152. We asked a large number of potential sources, including both claims administration firms
and individual attorneys, for the administrative fees associated with as many antitrust class action
cases as they could produce. But the most of the potential sources were too busy or for other reasons
declined to supply us with this information. We have no way of knowing whether those who did
supply us with information are typical.

2013]

Private Antitrust Enforcement

1307

Table 11: Administrative Expenses
Claim
Filing
Deadline

Direct or
Indirect
Purchaser
Class

% of Gross
Fund
Allocated to
Administration

2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct

0.90%
1.67%
6.96%
3.86%
3.06%
7.95%
1.95%
2.91%
4.07%
4.54%
2.27%
5.86%
4.18%

2005

Indirect

6.33%

2005

Indirect

5.30%

Case 16

2005

Indirect

4.14%

Case 17

2005

Indirect

2.87%

Case 18

2005

Indirect

5.01%

Case 19
Case 20

2005
2006

Direct
Direct

6.26%
4.17%

Case 21

2007

Indirect

3.95%

Case 22

2007

Indirect

9.25%

Case 23

2008

Indirect

4.43%

Case 24

2008

Indirect

8.13%

Case
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Case 5
Case 6
Case 7
Case 8
Case 9
Case 10
Case 11
Case 12
Case 13
Lupron
Consumer
Relafen
Consumer

Settlement
Fund
$35,000,000
$104,600,000
$6,200,000
$202,845,329
$32,000,000
$34,000,000
$31,500,000
$89,194,765
$9,000,000
$9,330,000
$64,000,000
$9,700,000
$21,000,000
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
$22,600,000
$38,700,000
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
More than $10
Million
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Case 25
Case 26
Tricor
Indirect
Purchaser
Consumer
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2008
2008
2009

Direct
Direct

Indirect
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1.85%
0.03%

$6,354,441
$250,000,000

7.09%

More than $10
Million

Case 28

2009

Indirect

5.46%

Case 29
Case 30
Case 31
Visa/
MasterCard
Average

2009
2009
2010

Direct
Direct
Direct

0.38%
0.88%
1.31%

More than $10
Million
$60,000,000
$14,650,000
$20,000,000

2005

Direct

2.34%

$3,456,000,000

4.10%

The administrative costs in the cases, all of which had claim filing
deadlines between 2003 and 2010, averaged 4% of the recoveries (with
the average (mean) calculated by giving each case equal weight). All
were less than 10%. These thirty-two cases, moreover, were mostly
moderate153 in size: twenty-seven involved settlements of $6–$70 million
each and the largest was $250 million—except for the massive Visa/MasterCard case.154 There are fixed costs associated with returning
overcharges to victims, so it would be logical for the percentage of administrative costs to be smaller for larger cases and to be largest for the
smallest recoveries. Indeed, in one of the largest antitrust cases in history, the Visa/MasterCard case, the administrative fees were particularly

153. Id. Although in many respects $6–$70 million is a large settlement, the majority of the
sixty cases in our study involved settlements of more than $100 million, and nine were at least $700
million.
154. Id.
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low as a percentage.155 They required an expenditure of 2.34% of the
settlement fund to distribute more than $3 billion.156
Thus, the average of the legal fees for the forty-five cases in our
sample we were able to ascertain (their weighted average was 14% and
their unweighted average was 26%) plus the average of these administrative costs (which were 4% for the sample of thirty-two cases) would total
approximately 18% to 30% of the settlements. If these averages apply to
our entire sample,157 this would mean that the victims received 70% to
82% of the settlements.158 Since the settlements totaled at least $33.8 to
$35.8 billion (plus products, discounts, etc.) this would mean that the
victims in the sixty cases we studied received at least $23.66 to $29.4
billion in cash.
To be sure, we make no representation that these thirty-two cases
are typical of antitrust class action settlements.159 We readily concede
155. “The class members received $3,456,000,000. The attorney fees were $225,165,006.25.
The total expenses were $88,333,552.89 of which $57,234,450.87 were for the claims administrator,
$18,716,511.44 were expenses awarded by the Court to the class representatives and class counsel in
the decision approving the settlement and awarding fees and costs and $12,382,590.58 in supplemental expenses approved by the Court which included items such as the objectors’ fees, the special
master appointed by the court, counsel fees for lawyers and consultants who worked on the securitization, audit fees and supplemental costs incurred by lead counsel . . . [and] $1,748,505.93 awarded
to three Cy Pres recipients.” E-mail from Lloyd Constantine, Counsel, Cannon, LLP to Robert H.
Lande, Venable Prof. of Law, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law (Nov. 9, 2011, 17:43 EST) (on file
with author).
156. Including all the expenses, the administrative costs were $88.33 million divided by
($3,456 million plus $225.17 million attorney’s fees plus $88.33 administrative expenses plus $1.75
million in cy pres, which equals $3,771.25 million), which equals 2.34%.
157. We were almost always able to ascertain the legal fees for class action cases, but had
problems finding the legal fees for competitor cases. We have no empirical evidence on point, but
believe that legal fees in competitor cases may be lower on average. Class action attorneys often
have to charge more because they are working on a contingency. Because they receive nothing if
they lose, they have to charge a premium to cover their risk of failure. By contrast, attorneys in competitor cases are less likely to be working on a contingency basis.
158. These numbers likely understate the recovery. We did not use a weighted average. Doing
so would arguably be appropriate because it would reflect that cases with a greater recovery have a
larger impact on the success of private enforcement compensating victims. A weighted average
would have lowered the percentage, given that larger cases generally involve a lower percentage of
administrative fees.
159. As discussed in note 149 supra, we have no way of knowing whether those who did supply us with information are typical. To be sure, the data we collected are suggestive. Eleven of these
cases involved payments to indirect purchasers, and these cases averaged 5.6% in administrative
costs, while the twenty-one direct purchaser cases averaged 3.1%. Moreover, it makes intuitive sense
that direct purchaser classes, which would be expected to have fewer members and about which
defendants are likely to have better information and means of communication, would involve lower
administrative costs than indirect purchaser classes, which are likely to have more members and
gathering information about them and communicating with them is apt to be more difficult. Since the
cases were not randomly selected and are few in number, we hesitate to come to a strong conclusion
that indirect purchaser cases involve higher administrative costs than direct purchaser cases. More
research is needed.
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there have been cases necessitating substantially higher administrative
costs.160 Nevertheless, at a minimum we can reach the safe conclusion
that there have been a number of antitrust class action cases that, after
legal fees and claims administration expenses are subtracted, returned in
the range of 70% to 82% of the recovery to victims. And there also have
been unusual cases, like the Visa/MasterCard case, that returned more
than 90% of a settlement to plaintiffs.161
It also should be noted that the victims in the cases we studied
sometimes received products, coupons, or discounts. The methodology
of our study was to be conservative by not counting the compensatory
effects of products, coupons, discounts or rate reductions. Due to our
omissions we stated that our study was providing only a lower bound on
the compensation effects of these cases. If Professor Crane is fairly going
to argue that these cases have not meaningfully compensated victims, as
opposed to only calculating a lower bound on the benefits of these cases,
he should have included these omissions back into the analysis to the
extent they were valuable to the victims. For example, the relief in the
Auction House Cases included $125 million in coupons,162 which we
conservatively did not count as a cash benefit. These coupons were fully
transferable (and were in fact transferred) and fully redeemable in cash if
not used for five years.163 We would be very interested in knowing why
he dismisses these coupons as unworthy of consideration as compensation for the real victims of the collusion at issue.
We certainly would prefer to generalize from larger and better samples. But it should be noted that critics who assert that the total of legal
fees and administrative expenses “often swallow the entire recovery”
offer no evidence to support their statements.
Another argument by Professor Crane is that compensation “fails”
as a goal because the illegal overcharges are passed through various layers in the distribution chain, so the recoveries do not end up with the real
victims of the initial overcharges.164 Professor Crane “proves” this using
a “typical” example—a hypothetical dominant medical equipment manufacturer entering into exclusive contracts with hospitals that unlawfully
160. We do not know of a specific example. But surely there have been small class action cases
with extremely high administrative costs and 33% attorney’s fees.
161. As noted, the administrative expenses in this case were 2.34%. The attorney’s fees were
$225.17 million, divided by the total of $3,771.25 million, which equals 5.97%. In 2007 we reported
legal fees in this case of 6.5%. We believe the difference is due to the fact that the settlement earned
interest before it was distributed. Regardless, the total of legal fees and administrative expenses was
less than 10%. See Twenty Case Studies, supra note 11.
162. See Forty Cases, supra note 6, at 13–18.
163. These coupons were 20% of the legal fees in this case. Id.
164. Id.
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lock out competitors and allow the manufacturer to charge a monopoly
price. In his hypothetical, the distributors originally pay the overcharge,
and some, but not all, of that overcharge is passed on to the hospitals.
The hospital also passes along some, but not all, of the overcharge to the
patients. The patients are not often directly affected, because they pay an
insurance co-pay, and so the insurance companies pay the bulk of the
overcharge.165
It is telling that Professor Crane characterizes his lone hypothetical
as “typical.” His hypothetical involves monopoly exclusion, but most
significant private recoveries are against illegal collusion,166 which usually is far simpler to analyze. Moreover, the medical industry involves an
anomalous market, one in which insurance plays an unusual role and intermediaries often charge based on their costs. Even though Crane could
have assembled a group of ten or twenty actual cases to analyze, on the
basis of his lone exclusive-dealing hypothetical he dismisses the more
than $12 billion paid to direct purchasers in the cases studied in our earlier survey: “Since direct purchasers often pass along a substantial portion of any overcharges downstream, over two-thirds of the recoveries
studied [those involving direct purchasers] likely failed to compensate
the parties who ultimately absorbed most of the economic injury.”167
Crucially, Crane does not analyze what happened to the overcharges or the subsequent recoveries in any of the direct purchaser cases in our
study (or in any other actual cases). He merely asserts that the direct pur165. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 681–82:
To see why private enforcement fails at compensating for wealth transfer, consider
the chain of loss-causation in a typical antitrust claim. A dominant durable medical
equipment manufacturer enters into exclusive dealing contracts with hospitals and the
group purchasing organizations (“GPOs”) that bargain on the hospitals’ behalf. The exclusive contracts unlawfully lock out potential competitors and allow the manufacturer to
charge a monopoly price. In the first instance, the monopoly overcharge is paid by distributors that stock goods for the hospitals. The hospitals have complex billing arrangements with the distributors in which some, but not all, of the overcharge is passed on to
the hospital. The hospitals then pass along some, but not necessarily all, of this overcharge to their patients.
The patients are often not directly affected by the overcharge. This is because the
patients’ co-pay for using hospital services remains initially unaffected; their insurance
companies pay the bulk of the passed-on overcharge. The insurance companies may
eventually increase their premiums or co-pays, but these future increases may fall on a
different set of insured than those who received monopoly-priced services. For large classes of patients such as the indigent and the elderly, any overcharge borne by the hospitals
may be passed onto taxpayers in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, or direct hospital subsidization. This complex scenario has countless analogues in the world of manufacturing,
sales, and distribution. Thus, a monopoly overcharge often produces numerous ripples in
the economy.
166. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at Tables 8–10, pp. 912–13.
167. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 682.
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chasers “often” pass on “a substantial portion” of the overcharges, so that
direct purchaser cases “likely fail[] to compensate the parties who ultimately absorb[] most of the economic injury.”168 In reality, Crane does
not know the percentage of the recoveries that was returned to actual victims in the cases we studied. Yet, on the basis of his conjecture, he completely dismisses more than $12 billion in overcharges paid to direct purchasers as not having compensated the true victims of antitrust violations.
Crane instead could have analyzed the direct purchaser cases in the
study he cites. He could have delved into the facts of the Auction House
Cases, for example, where firms were convicted of conspiring to raise
auction commission rates.169 We would be extremely interested in the
results if he analyzed how much of the $552 million recovery ultimately
went to people who were victimized by the cartel; we would be puzzled
unless, not counting the 5.2% that went for attorney’s fees, almost all
went to the real victims of the collusion. But Crane does not even consider the possibility that almost all of the direct purchasers could have
been end users directly affected by the collusion.
To be sure, in some cases firms surely pass a percentage of the
overcharge to direct purchasers to the next level in the distribution chain.
But it also is true that direct purchasers often recover in settlement only a
fraction of the overcharges they pay, an amount that does not fully compensate them for their losses.170 Suppose, for example, that a cartel overcharged direct purchasers by $100 million, and that direct purchasers
pass 50% of this overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain.
Also suppose that the direct purchasers received only 30% of the amount
they were overcharged. Even if a victimized direct purchaser passed on
50% of the overcharge to its own customers, the direct victim still had a
net loss, an initial loss of $50 million that was only 60% compensated by
the settlement.171
There is, moreover, another type of harm to direct purchasers that
Crane does not consider. When direct purchasers pay higher prices, to
the extent they pass on these increases they tend to sell a lower quantity
of the product involved. This lower volume reduces their profit. Thus,
168. Id. at 684.
169. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 13–18.
170. See Connor & Lande, supra note 113.
171. See John M. Connor, Private Recoveries In International Cartel Cases Worldwide: What
do the Data Show? 1, 14 (American Antitrust Institute, Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), available
at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/WorkingPaperNo12-03.pdf (finding
that U.S. victims in a sample of thirty-three international cartels received only 30% of single damages in settlement on average). In this hypothetical the indirect purchaser also absorbed a $50 million
overcharge, but received nothing in the recovery.

2013]

Private Antitrust Enforcement

1313

even if some direct purchasers initially appeared to receive excessive
compensation as a result of an antitrust case, this appearance may well be
misleading unless their lost profits also were replaced.
For these reasons Crane’s argument should have been that it is possible that some of the $12 billion in recoveries received by direct purchasers in the cases we studied might not have compensated the actual
victims of antitrust violations. But he does not prove that even this actually happened to a significant extent. His arguments certainly do not justify discounting all payments made to direct purchasers. 172
Professor Crane’s analysis of payments made to indirect purchasers
in our study is similarly faulty. He writes: “[O]ne should also consider
the $1.815 billion recovered in the six indirect purchaser cases to gauge
whether these recoveries help to offset the phenomenon . . . . [especially
the huge] El Paso litigation, which resulted in a $1.4 billion recovery for
the indirect purchasers. . . . In each case, the settlement pot was further
reduced by an attorney’s fee award, generally in the 20 to 33 percent
range.”173 However, the attorney’s fees in the case Crane primarily analyzes, the El Paso case,174 constituted only 6% of the settlement, a fact
Crane strikingly omits from his narrative.175
Crane has more to say about the El Paso case, which yielded $1.4
billion for indirect purchasers:176
[T]he settlement provided for a complex scheme of remittances to
the California Public Utilities Commission and for natural gas rate
reductions over fifteen to twenty years. . . . One may describe the El
Paso scheme as compensating consumers as a class, but such a description would be largely inaccurate. This is because consumer injuries occurring in the past correspond only roughly to future consumer gains. Injured consumers who died, moved away from California, or discontinued natural gas service over the rate-reduction
period received no compensation, or they received compensation
that bore little relation to the amount of their injury. On the other
172. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer
Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 544 (2003) (suggesting that direct purchasers at times may not
be able to pass on overcharges).
173. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 685.
174. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 77–87 (analyzing the El Paso case).
175. Professor Crane also argues that the $1.815 billion in indirect purchaser recoveries should
be reduced for attorney’s fees. Although one might be able justify doing this, it also would make
sense to express all values in constant dollars. The El Paso settlement was in 2001, but Professor
Crane published his article in 2010. If El Paso’s $1.427 billion recovery were reduced by 6% for
attorney’s fees, down to $1.341 billion, but expressed in 2010 dollars, it would actually be a higher
amount: $1.65 billion. But Professor Crane performs only downward adjustments in the amounts
victims recover from lawbreakers.
176. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 685–86.
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hand, consumers who moved to California or otherwise began natural gas consumption after the violation received a windfall. In sum,
consumers whose consumption patterns or volume changed significantly from the time of the violation to the rate-reduction period
were either overcompensated or undercompensated. The El Paso
settlement did not amount to a serious effort to identify persons who
suffered economic harm and compensate them in proportion to their
loss.177

However, Crane ignores crucial facts in this case, even though he cites to
our eleven-page analysis of the facts four times.178 As we reported, the
settlement included $551 million in upfront cash and stock valued at
market rates. Crane omits this in his description of the case’s benefits.
Surely upfront payments to consumers do a wonderful job of compensating the actual victims of a violation. Moreover, our analysis of this case
noted that we (perhaps being overly conservative) did not count the settlement’s $125 million in future rate reductions on electricity as a benefit
from the case.179
The $876 million in cash payments that will be made to victims in
the future are more difficult to analyze. It certainly is true there will not
be a perfect correspondence between the 13 million California consumers and 3,000 businesses who were overcharged by El Paso and the future beneficiaries of the settlement. But even if a consumer sells her
home soon after the settlement was inked, to the extent the market was
efficient—which economists so often assume—the value of the house
should have increased accordingly, since the purchaser of the house will
be receiving a share of the settlement. The homeowners at the time of the
settlement should have reaped the capitalized value of the discounted
present value of the settlement when they sold their home.
To the extent the market is not efficient, however, we ultimately do
not know, for example, how many California residents will leave the
state after they have collected only five years of cash payments. But neither does Professor Crane. Rather, he points out that the correspondence
between the overcharge and the recovery is imperfect, speculates about
and magnifies this imperfection and, on the basis of a mismatch whose
extent is unproven, dismisses the entire $1.427 billion settlement, saying
that it would be “largely inaccurate” to say that the settlement compensated the victims. While we agree that the settlement did not produce
perfect compensation, Crane has not given us any information on which
to dismiss the recovery completely or even “largely.”
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 77.
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Crane adopts another analytic strategy that causes him to discount
the value of the compensation obtained through private antitrust enforcement. “Economists and antitrust scholars increasingly view static
consumer injuries as far less significant than dynamic injuries.”180 In other words, scholarly commentators are much more concerned with the
tendency of antitrust violations to stifle innovation than they are with its
tendency to increase the prices consumers must pay for existing goods.
Crane then contends that antitrust laws fail to compensate consumers
adequately because they tend to focus on static injuries—for example,
the paying of overcharges—rather than on dynamic injuries—such as a
loss of access to new products.
In this regard Professor Crane is mixing apples and oranges. The
prevailing view among scholarly commentators has long been that the
primary, if not exclusive, focus of antitrust doctrine should be on creating efficient incentives, not on compensating victims.181 Thus, he cites
Professor Hovenkamp’s statement that innovation and technological progress contribute more to “economic growth” than does achieving the
right level of static efficiency.182 This view of law as serving to create
ideal incentives rather than to redress past wrongs is largely the result of
the injection of Chicago School economic analysis into antitrust.183 For
these commentators, compensating victims is just a means to an end, not
an end in itself.
When Crane concludes that dynamic injuries matter more than static injuries, he is improperly importing views about incentives—and deterrence—into a discussion about compensation. When it comes to compensating for injuries from anticompetitive behavior, Crane offers no
reason why a consumer suffers any lesser injury from paying an extra
$1,000 for a good than from being deprived of an opportunity to buy a
superior good that would be worth an additional $1,000 to her. Considered prospectively—viewed in terms of economic growth—innovation is
much more important than static efficiency, but this does not mean as a
matter of retributive justice $1,000 worth of one sort of harm is any more
significant than $1,000 of another sort of harm. To the contrary, economists assume harms that can properly be measured at $1,000 are of precisely equal value to a victim, whatever that $1,000 represents.184 If Pro-

180. Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 688.
181. The authors of this Article believe that an important purpose of the antitrust laws is to
compensate victims, but we acknowledge that this position may not be the prevailing view among
antitrust scholars.
182. Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 688 n.62.
183. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23–25 (4th ed. 1992).
184. Id.
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fessor Crane has a different view, he should develop a theory of compensation in antitrust to justify it.
In sum, this article presented documentation that sixty private cases
that ended since 1990 have returned more than $33 billion in cash, plus
additional amounts in coupons, discounts, products, etc., to victims of
anticompetitive behavior. Surely this should create a heavy presumption
that a significant number of victims have been helped a substantial
amount by private litigation. Responsible critics can plausibly argue that
some of this $30 billion in recoveries might not have compensated the
actual victims of antitrust violations. We would agree with such a qualification. But neither Crane nor any other critic has shown that this has
happened to a predominant extent. Yet, only if it happens to such an extent that it can be shown to “swallow” the $33 billion—as Professor
Crane asserts but does not substantiate—should we dismiss the compensation effects of private litigation.
We believe the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that
antitrust cases have returned huge amounts of compensation to the true
victims of antitrust violation (including a significant portion of the $33
billion documented in this study, plus coupons, products, rate reductions,
etc.). We concede it is likely that some of these benefits did not go to the
true victims for a host of reasons, but $33 billion in benefits should not
be dismissed or even partially discounted on the basis of opinion, speculation, hypotheticals, or allegations.
III. CONCLUSION
No less august a body than the United States Supreme Court in
Twombly declared that defendants in antitrust cases sometimes settle
meritless cases.185 Yet the Court relied not on evidence, not on a survey
or study, but rather on the unsupported opinion of another appellate court
judge.186 Based on little more than conjecture, the Court made it more
difficult for all complaints to survive a motion to dismiss.
This Article is not a responsive cost-benefit analysis of private antitrust enforcement. But it does demonstrate more than $30 billion of its
benefits, which resulted from sixty cases that appear on the whole to
have had significant merit. By contrast, critics have not systematically
shown any significant costs, relying instead on more anecdotes or unsupported assertions. We know of no study providing evidence that any significant number of cases lacked merit and yet recovered substantial settlements.
185. See Questionable Innovation, supra note 50, at 370.
186. Id. Note that the Supreme Court ignored a trial court judge offering a conflicting opinion.
Id.
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Moreover, as a result of our decision only to count cash recoveries,
the information collected in this study provides only a substantial understatement of the benefits that private actions have achieved. This study
thus most emphatically does not provide a sense of the most favorable
results that private actions may have achieved, or even any notion of how
much they probably have achieved or how often or typically they have
achieved these results. It is a floor, but definitely not a ceiling, on the
benefits of private enforcement.
These findings are enough to create a presumption that private enforcement is in the public interest. Indeed, modern antitrust is in large
part a battle over presumptions and burdens of proof. In light of our results, the burden should now shift to the critics. Critics of private antitrust enforcement should now be required to provide some similarly
credible systematic evidence to substantiate their positions.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Formal Names and Citations to the Twenty New Cases that
this Study Analyzed
1. Meijer, Inc. v. 3M, C.A. No. 04-5871 (E.D. Pa. Aug 14, 2006)
(“3M”).
2. In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., MD 061775JGVVP, 2008 WL 5958061 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008), report and recommendation adopted in part, 06-MD1775(JG)(VVP), 2009 WL 3443405 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009)
(“Air Cargo”).
3. Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 08-2784 et al., 12 (3rd Cir.
Dec. 21, 2011) (en banc). Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667
F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1876, 182 l. Ed.
2d 646 (U.S. 2012), reh’g denied 132 S.Ct. 2451 (U.S. 2012)
(“DeBeers”).
4. In re Elec. Carbon Products Antitrust Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 144
(D.N.J. 2007) (“Electrical Carbon Fiber”).
5. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust
Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Conn. 2009) (“EPDM”).
6. In re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., 00 MDL 1368
(CLB), 2006 WL 931692 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2006) (“High Pressure Laminates”).
7. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., MDL 05-1717JJF, 2005 WL 1838069 (D. Del. 2007) (“Intel”).
8. In re Polyester Staple Antitrust Litig., C.A. No. 3:03-1516
(W.D.N.C. July 19, 2007) (“Polyester Staple”).
9. Molecular Diagnostics Laboratories v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D.D.C. 2005) (“MDL v. Hoffman”).
10. In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (“Methionine”).
11. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22521 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2000); In re Monosodium
Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 229 (D. Minn. 2001)
(“MSG”).
12. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369
(D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2002) (“Mylan”).
13. Novell v. Microsoft (complaint not filed).
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14. Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. v. Amgen Inc., CIV. 05-4850
(SRC), 2006 WL 3392939 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2006) (“Ortho Biotech”).
15. In re OSB Antitrust Litig., 06-826. 2007 WL 2253419 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 3, 2007) (“OSB”).
16. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., C.A. No. 01:02-0844 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (“Scrap Metal”).
17. Deloach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., No. 1:00CV01234,
2004 WL 5508762 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (“Tobacco”).
18. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. 2008) (“Tricor”).
19. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), modified, 183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229
(2d Cir. 2003), enforced, 98 CIV. 7076 (BSJ), 2007 WL
1741885 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007) (“Visa MC”).
20. In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir.
2004) (“Warfarin”).
Table A2: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Cases in Original Sample
of Forty Cases
Kind of Validation of Merits

Number of Cases

Criminal Penalty

13 out of 40 (32.5%)

Government Obtained Civil Relief

12 out of 40 (30%)

Ds Lost Trial in Same or
Related Case

9 out of 40 (22.5%)

Ps Survived or Prevailed at
Summary Judgment

9 out of 40 (22.5%)

Ps Survived Motion to
Dismiss

3 out 40 (7.5%)

At Least One Basis for
Validation

34 out of 40 (85%)

At Least One Basis for
Validation, not including surviving
motion to dismiss

33 out of 40 (82.5%)
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Table A3: Summary of Validation of Merits in Individual Cases for the
Twenty Newly Analyzed Cases
Case

Validation of Merits

3M

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss,
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case,
Class Certification for Litigation
Criminal Penalty,
Surviving Motion to Dismiss

Air Cargo
De Beers

Guilty Plea

Electrical
Carbon Fiber

Guilty Pleas,
Criminal Penalty,
Class Certification for Litigation,
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss
Class Certification for Litigation,
Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment
Class Certification for Litigation, Plaintiffs Survived Summary Judgment and Judgment as a Matter of Law
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case,
Government Settlement/Fine

EPDM
High
Pressure
Laminates
Intel v. AMD
MDL v.
Hoffman

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss

Methionine

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss,
Class Certification for Litigation

MSG

Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment,
Class Certified for Litigation,
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case,
Government Obtained Civil Relief

Mylan
(Lorazepam &
Clorazepate)
Novell v.
Microsoft

Ds Lost in EU Government Proceeding

Ortho
Biotech
OSB

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss,
Class Certification for Litigation
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Criminal Penalty,
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss,
Class Certification for Litigation
Criminal Penalty,
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case,
Class Certification for Litigation,
Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss,
Class Certification for Litigation
Government Obtained Civil Relief,
Class Certification for Litigation,
Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment,
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss
Government Obtained Civil Relief,
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss,
Class Certification for Litigation

Table A4: “Pure” Recoveries from Foreign Cartels and Monopolies
Case
Air Cargo
De Beers
Electrical Carbon Fiber
MSG
OSB

Recovery ($s Millions)
273
295
30
122
44

Total

764
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Table A5: Recoveries from Foreign Cartels and Monopolies Which
Cannot Be Separated from Domestic Companies’ Recoveries187
Case
EPDM
Methionine
Polyester Staple
Tricor

Recovery ($s Millions)
107
107
61
316

Total

591

Table A6: Un-weighted Average Attorney’s Fee Percentage
Case ($ millions in the recovery)
Airline Ticket Commission (86)
Augmentin (91)
NCAA (74)
Remeron (75)
Platinol (50)
Remeron (75)
Taxol (66)
Drill Bits (53)
Polypropylene Carpet (50)
Sorbates (96)
Terazosin (74)
Microcrystalline Cellulose (50)
Specialty Steel (50)
Lysine (65)
Commercial Explosives (77)
Automative Refinishing Paint (106)
Buspirone (220)
Cardizem (110)
DRAM (326)
Flat Glass (122)

Attorney’s Fee
Percentage
33.3
21.6188
26.8
33.3
33.3
33.3
30
30.8
33.3
27.5189
33.3
33.3
30
7
15
32.65190
33.3
30
25
32

187. The cases listed in Table A5 involve settlements with multiple defendants in which either
the defendants are grouped together with both foreign companies and domestic, making it impossible
to tell which part of the recovery comes from the foreign company, or the defendants are subsidiaries
of foreign companies operating in the United States.
188. Weighted average of direct (20%) and indirect (25%).
189. Average of 22%–33%.
190. Average of 32%–33.3%.
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Linerboard (202)
Oil Lease (193)
Paxil (165)
Relafen (250)
Visa/MasterCard (3,383)
Auction Houses (552)
El Paso (1,427)
Fructose (531)
NASDAQ (1,027)
Total: 9646
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30
25
25191
33
6.5
5.2192
6
25
13
Average : 25.64%

Table A7: Weighted Average Attorney’s Fee Percentage
Case ($ millions in the
recovery)
Airline Ticket Commission
(86)
Augmentin (91)
NCAA (74)
Remeron (75)
Platinol (50)
Remeron (75)
Taxol (66)
Drill Bits (53)
Polypropylene Carpet (50)
Sorbates (96)
Terazosin (74)
Microcrystalline Cellulose
(50)
Specialty Steel (50)
Lysine (65)
Commercial Explosives (77)
Automative Refinishing
Paint (106)

Attorney’s
Fee
Percentage
33.3

Weighted Value193
2863.8

21.6194
26.8
33.3
33.3
33.3
30
30.8
33.3
27.5195
33.3
33.3

1956.6
1983.2
2497.5
1665
2497.5
1980
1632.4
1665
2640
2464.2
1665

30
7
15
32.65196

1500
455
1155
3460.9

191. Average of 20% and 30%.
192. Plaintiffs’ attorneys received 20% of their fee in coupons—the same percentage that class
members got of their recovery in coupons.
193. Case award total multiplied by Attorney’s Fee Percentage yields the Weighted Value.
194. Weighted average of direct (20%) and indirect (25%).
195. Average of 22%–33%.
196. Average of 32%–33.3%.
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Buspirone (220)
Cardizem (110)
DRAM (326)
Flat Glass (122)
Linerboard (202)
Oil Lease (193)
Paxil (165)
Relafen (250)
Visa/MasterCard (3,383)
Auction Houses (552)
El Paso (1,427)
Fructose (531)
NASDAQ (1,027)
Total: 9646

[Vol. 36:1269

33.3
7326
30
3300
25
8150
32
3904
30
6060
25
4825
25197
4125
33
8250
6.5
21989.5
5.2198
2870.4
6
8562
25
13275
13
13351
Weighted Average: 14.31%199

Table A8: Present Value (in 2011 dollars) of the Recoveries in the Forty
Previously Studied Private Cases

#

Case Name

Year

Recovery
Amount in
Millions (Before CPI/PPI)

1

1997

86.1

121.71

2

Airline Ticket
Commission Litigation
Auction Houses

412/40

542.85/49.32

3

Ryan-House

2000/
2003200
2004

91.5

109.9

4

Automotive
Refinishing Paint
Buspirone
Caldera, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp.
Cardizem CD

2007

105.75

115.72

2003
2000

220
275

271.28
362.34

2004

110

132.12

5
6
7

2011 $s
(millions)
(CPI)

197. Average of 20% and 30%.
198. Plaintiffs’ attorneys received 20% of their fee in coupons—the same percentage that class
members got of their recovery in coupons.
199. Weighted Value Total (138078) divided by Case Award Total (9646) equals Weighted
Average (14.31%).
200. Auction Houses included two classes which recovered in different years, a Domestic Class
(2000) and a Foreign Class (2003).
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1997
1998
2000 or
2002201
2007

326

2003

551/876202

13

Citric Acid
Commercial Explosives
Conwood Co.
v. U.S. Tobacco, Co.
Dynamic Random
Access Memory
Natural Gas
Antitrust Cases
Flat Glass

2005

121.7

679.43/1080.
19
141.38

14

Fructose

2004

531

637.79

15

Graphite Electrodes

2003

47

57.96

16

IBM v. Microsoft

2005

775

900.35

17

Insurance

1995

36

53.6

18

Linerboard

2004

202.5

243.22

19

Amino Acid Lysine

1996/1997

45/5/15/15203

20

Microcystalline
Cellulose
NASDAQ
Market-Makers
Law v. NCAA

2005/2003

25/25

1998

1027

65.07/7.07/
21.2/21.2
29.04/
30.83204
1429.54

2000

74.5

98.16

North Shore
Hematology & Oncology
Lease Oil
Netscape Comm.
Corp. v. Microsoft
Oncology & Radiation
Associates

2004

50

60.06

1999
2003

193.5
750

263.52
924.82

2003

65.8

81.14

11
12

21
22
23
24
25
26

86.2
113
1050

1325
121.86
157.29
1383.57 or
1324.25
356.73

201. Conwood Co. had the trial in 2000, then an appeal and trebling in 2002, so we calculated
both.
202. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases included $551 million in cash and stock and $876 in semiannual cash.
203. Amino Acid Lysine had a class for major defendants (1996), a separate case for two defendants (1997), and then estimates for state opt-out plaintiffs and federal class opt-out payments
($15 million each). See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6 at tbl. 14. The $15 million estimates
are calculated based on 1997 dollars.
204. It was uncertain if these were two different recoveries, so both are included in the total.
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36
37
38
39
40
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Stop N Shop
Supermarket Co.
Polyproylene Carpet

2005

165

191.69

2001

49.7

63.67

RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Microsoft
Red Eagle Resources

2005

478 - 761
45.4/8

555.31 –
884.09
71.29/12.25

175/75

210.19/87.13

75
250.4/18.5

87.13
290.9/20.82

96.5

121.71

2004

700

840.77

2002
1992

74.5
50

93.96
80.86

2006
2003

73.3
3383

82.49
4171.55

2003

4200 5600208

5178.99 –
6905.32

1993/
1994205
Relafen
2004/
2005206
Remeron
2005
Rubber Chemicals
2005/
2006207
Sorbates Direct Purchaser 2002

Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft
Terazosin Hydrochloride
Transamerican Refining
Corp
Urethane
Visa Check/
MasterMoney
Vitamins
TOTAL209

22651.65 –
24766.08

205. Red Eagle Resources has two recovery amounts given and no explanation; they are added
together in the total.
206. Relafen has an Direct class (2004) and an Indirect Class (2005).
207. Rubber Chemicals has recovery amounts for Bayer (2005) and Flexsys (2006).
208. Vitamins provided a conservative average of settlement dates.
209. The total is calculated first using all the lowest possible numbers where a range is given,
then using the higher numbers.
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Table A9: Recoveries for the Twenty Newly Studied Cases with a
Criminal Penalty as Well
Case

Recovery ($ millions)

AirCargo

278

De Beers

295

Electrical Carbon Fiber

30

Polyester Staple

61

Scrap Metal

34.5

Total

699

Table A10: Recoveries in the Twenty Newly Studied Cases Validated by
Government Action

AirCargo

Validation of Merits in
Government Action
Guilty Pleas

Recovery
($ millions)
278

De Beers

Guilty Plea

295

Electrical Carbon
Fiber

Guilty Pleas

30

Intel

Settlement with FTC,
EU Fine

1250

Mylan

Settlement with FTC

70

Novell v. Microsoft

EU Fine and Injunctive
Relief

536

Polyester Staple
Scrap Metal

Guilty Pleas, Fines
Conviction, Guilty
Pleas, Fines

61
34.5

Tricor

Settlement with State
Attorneys General

316

Visa MC

DOJ won at trial
and on appeal

6813

Case

Total

9684
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Table A11: Judges Presiding Over Twenty Newly Studied Private Cases
by Appointing President210
Judge

Case

John
Padova
Gleeson
Chesler

3M

Simandle
Dorsey/
Underhill
Brieant
Farnan
Henry
Kennedy
Breyer
Magnuson
Hogan
Chesler
Diamond
Voorhees
Nugent
Osteen
Robinson
Jones
Robinson

Air Cargo
De Beers
Electrical
Carbon Fiber
EPDM
High Pressure
Laminates
Intel v. AMD
MDL v.
Hoffman
Methionine
MSG
Mylan
(Lorazepam &
Clorazepate)
Ortho Biotech
OSB
Polyester Staple
Scrap Metal
Tobacco
Tricor
Visa MC
Warfarin

Nominated
By

Political Party

Bush

Republican

Clinton
Bush

Democrat
Republican

Bush

Republican

Reagan/
Clinton

Republican/
Democrat

Nixon

Republican

Reagan

Republican

Clinton

Democrat

Clinton
Reagan

Democrat
Republican

Reagan

Republican

Bush
Bush

Republican
Republican

Reagan

Republican

Clinton
Bush
Bush
Clinton
Bush

Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Total
Republicans: 14
Total
Democrats: 6

210. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
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Table A12: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Twenty
Newly Studied Cases
Kind of Validation of Merits

Number of Cases

Criminal Penalty

5 out of 20 (25%)

Government Obtained Civil Relief

5 out of 20 (25%)

Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case

4 out of 20 (20%)

Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment or Judgment as a Matter of Law

5 out of 20 (25%)

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss

11 out of 20 (55%)

Class Certification for Litigation

11 out of 20 (55%)

At Least One Basis for Validation

19 out of 20 (95%)

At Least One Basis for Validation, Not Including Surviving Motion to Dismiss or
Certification of Litigation Class

14 out of 20 (70%)

Table A13: Total Corporate Antitrust Fines 1990–2011211

1990

Total
Corporate
Fines ($000)
22,658

1991

17,573

1992

22,430

1993

40,427

1994

38,996

1995

40,222

1996

25,245

1997

203,931

Year (Fiscal)

211. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990–1999 12,
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/246419.pdf [hereinafter 1990–1999 WORKLOAD];
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000–2009 13, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/281484.pdf [hereinafter 2000–2009 WORKLOAD]; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2002–2011 11, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.pdf [hereinafter 2002–2011 WORKLOAD].
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1998

241,645

1999

959,866

2000

303,241

2001

270,778

2002

93,826

2003

63,752

2004

140,586

2005

595,966

2006

469,805

2007

615,671

2008

695,042

2009

973,740

2010

338,645

2011

380,032

Total

6,554,077
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Table A14: Total Individual Antitrust Fines 1990–2011212

Year (Fiscal)

Total
Individual
Fines ($000)

1990

917

1991

2,806

1992

1,275

1993

1,868

1994

1,240

1995

1,211

1996

1,572

1997

1,247

1998

2,499

212. 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 211,
at 13; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 11.
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1999

12,273

2000

5,180

2001

2,019

2002

8,685

2003

470

2004

644

2005

4,483

2006

3,650

2007

15,109

2008

1,485

2009

605

2010

4,373

2011

1,522

Total

75,133
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Table A15: Total Restitution 1990–2011213

1990

Restitution Imposed
in Connection with
Criminal Antitrust
Cases ($000)
5,670

1991

3,185

1992

3,550

1993

950

1994

4,220

1995

1,200

1996

799

1997

275

1998

4,250

1999

2,343

2000

1,713

2001

31,083

2002

7,278

2003

15,545

2004

18,776

2005

10,371

2006

2,165

2007

4,790

2008

5,226

2009

17,060

2010

24,271

2011

6,377

Total

171,097

Year

213. See 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note
211, at 13; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12.
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Table A16: Total Incarceration 1990–2011214

1990

Incarceration: Number of Days of
Prison Time Sentenced in Antitrust Division Cases
2,739

1991

6,594

1992

2,488

1993

4,726

1994

1,497

1995

3,902

1996

2,431

1997

789

1998

1,301

1999

6,662

2000

5,584

2001

4,800

2002

10,501

2003

9,341

2004

7,334

2005

13,157

2006

5,383

2007

31,391

2008

14,331

2009

25,396

2010

26,046

2011

10,544

Total

196,937
196,937 ÷ 365.25 = 539.18 years

Year

214. 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 13; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 211,
at 14; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12.
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Table A17: Total of Non-Prison Confinement Days (e.g., House Arrest)
1990–2011215

1990

Number of Other Confinement
Days Sentenced in Antitrust
Division Cases
632

1991

1,519

1992

1,734

1993

3,552

1994

2,475

1995

2,933

1996

1,148

1997

1,270

1998

1,530

1999

2,850

2000

2,567

2001

1,844

2002

3,607

2003

1,025

2004

1,575

2005

1,270

2006

2,760

2007

1,085

2008

2,045

2009

2,195

2010

1,295

2011

2,075

Total

42,986
42986 ÷ 365.25 = 117.69 years

Year

215. 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 13; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 211,
at 14; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12.
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Table A18: Present Value (2011 dollars) of Financial Sanctions Imposed
from 1990–2011
#

Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Totals

Sanction216
Amounts Before
CPI ($000)
31,079
29,176
29,805
46,981
46,936
45,055
30,760
207,947
253,392
999,028
320,494
307,918
127,159
80,707
161,244
619,786
482,920
665,788
704,723
992,615
376,035
390,975
6,949,803

2011 Dollars
(CPI217) ($000)
53,488
48,185
46,631
73,134
71,240
66,500
44,099
291,435
349,679
1,348,862
418,650
391,094
158,994
98,664
192,007
713,846
538,827
722,293
736,263
1,040,743
387,905
390,978
8,183,517

216. All data taken from Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, Table 15, and updated by
2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 11. These figures represent the combined totals of corporate antitrust fines, individual antitrust fines, and restitution from 1990–2007. The individual antitrust fines were tripled. For explanation, see Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at Section IV.
217. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_cal
culator.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).

